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Intelligence collection must always evolve to meet technological 
developments.  Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, President 
George W. Bush authorized several surveillance programs to enhance 
intelligence collection on the severe threats facing the United States.1  However, 
these programs appeared to be inconsistent with the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), which governed intelligence collection that 
occurred inside the United States.2  Technology had evolved in the intervening 
decades in a manner that could not have been foreseen by FISA’s drafters and 
the statute was implicated by intelligence collection efforts that were likely 
never intended to be covered by the original statute.  These outdated provisions 
posed significant challenges for the Intelligence Community.  Ultimately, 
Congress passed the Protect America Act of 2007 (PAA) as a stop-gap measure, 
and the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA) to enable the government to 
target non-United States persons reasonably believed to be outside the United 
States to collect foreign intelligence information.3  Section 702 of the FAA is 
likely the most important statutory tool for intelligence collection, especially 
against terrorism, and is vital for protecting United States national security.  In 
2018, there were more than 164,000 Section 702 targets.4  The Intelligence 
Community would simply not be able to maintain nearly the same level of 
intelligence collection without Section 702.  Further, Section 702 allows for 
collection to occur in a stable and safe domestic environment and can yield intact 
copies of the entirety of communications.  This has been an extraordinary 
                                                     
 1. OIG, DEP’T OF DEFENSE ET AL., REPORT NO. 2009-0013-AS, UNCLASSIFIED REPORT ON 
THE PRESIDENT’S SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM 4–14 (2009), https://oig.justice.gov/ 
special/s0907.pdf [hereinafter OIG, DOD, REPORT ON SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM]. 
 2. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783, 1785, 
1790 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801, 1805 (2012)). 
 3. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Amendments Acts of 2008, Pub. L. No. 
110-261, § 702, 122 Stat. 2436, 2438 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2012)); Protect 
America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, § 105B, 121 Stat. 552, 552–54 (codified as amended at 
50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2007)). 
 4. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, STATISTICAL TRANSPARENCY REPORT 
REGARDING THE USE OF NATIONAL SECURITY AUTHORITIES FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2018 13 
(2019), https://www.dni.gov/files/CLPT/documents/2019_ASTR_for_CY2018.pdf [hereinafter 
DNI, TRANSPARENCY REPORT 2018]. 
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success story for United States signals intelligence (SIGINT) and developed as 
a response to changing technology and a new threat landscape. 
While the collection programs under Section 702 have produced a great deal 
of valuable intelligence over the last decade, the United States must begin to 
think about foreseeable technological developments and strategically consider 
how to conduct SIGINT collection in the future.  This Article identifies four 
technological trends that could significantly impact the way the United States 
conducts SIGINT.  Individuals now have access to sophisticated technologies 
that formerly only governments seemed capable of creating, and this 
decentralization of capabilities will likely only increase in the future.  The 
increased prevalence of anonymity and location-spoofing technologies offer 
benefits to individual users but may create significant difficulties for the 
Intelligence Community in determining the location of targets, which is a 
fundamental aspect of the current legal regime governing SIGINT activities.  
Also, the United States’ “home field” advantage is receding.  This trend means 
that the United States will have a smaller share of the world’s communications 
traffic transit its physical infrastructure, which will reduce the Intelligence 
Community’s ability to acquire precise and intact communications by serving 
directives on United States companies.  The push towards data localization laws 
may further reduce the United States’ home field advantage.  Finally, technology 
companies have begun to innovate in a manner that reduces their capability to 
respond to lawful government orders.  Technology companies are increasingly 
adopting encryption technologies and may shift data overseas to try to avoid 
complying with lawful surveillance orders.  Decisions by major private sector 
technology companies have the ability to shift how SIGINT is collected. 
If a person’s true location becomes increasingly more difficult to ascertain, 
the law should adapt to the uncertainty of location.  This Article analyzes several 
possible reforms.  Some have argued that the Fourth Amendment should apply 
to all individuals or that the Fourth Amendment should be presumed to apply 
unless that government can establish that no party to the communication is a 
United States person.5  In a world in which location becomes extremely difficult 
to determine accurately, the FISA legal regime governing SIGINT activities 
could create a new category for non-United States persons appearing to be 
located in the United States.  These individuals would be legitimate targets if the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) determined on an individualized 
basis that there is reasonable suspicion to believe that these individuals are likely 
to possess, receive, and/or communicate foreign intelligence information.  
Alternatively, if anonymity and location-spoofing technologies become more 
advanced and are widely adopted such that determining location becomes an 
extreme problem for SIGINT collection under Section 702, it could be necessary 
to reform FISA by creating two categories, one for United States persons and 
                                                     
 5. See, e.g., David Cole, We Are All Foreigners: NSA Spying and the Rights of Others, JUST 
SEC. (Oct. 29, 2013), https://www.justsecurity.org/2668/foreigners-nsa-spying-rights/; Jennifer 
Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L.J. 326, 383 (2015). 
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one for non-United States persons.  The more security-oriented reforms would 
push the limits of the foreign intelligence exception to the warrant clause in the 
Fourth Amendment.  Ultimately, this Article concludes that the best reform 
approach in a world in which location becomes extremely difficult to determine 
accurately would be to reform FISA to create a new category for non-United 
States persons appearing to be located in the United States, though it may be 
necessary to go even further depending on the severity of the problem.  In 
addition to legislative reforms, it may be prudent to create more forward leaning 
procedures to ease some of the difficulties that could be caused by increased 
uncertainty of the location of targets. 
Finally, as Section 702 becomes less useful in the future, the Intelligence 
Community must improve collection under Executive Order 12333 to ensure 
that the government continues to acquire vital intelligence to protect United 
States national security interests.  The National Security Agency (NSA) must 
continue to invest resources in being able to decrypt communications and 
acquiring unencrypted communications.  The United States government should 
continue to work to develop strong relationships with United States technology 
companies and seek to reduce the strains that have been created in the aftermath 
of the Snowden disclosures.  Also, as SIGINT collection under Executive Order 
12333 becomes more important, the Intelligence Community must increase its 
focus on obtaining the cooperation of foreign entities and compromising key 
strategic targets.  Beyond enhancing SIGINT collection capabilities, the 
Intelligence Community must focus on improving the ability to conduct 
intelligence analysis at scale by investing in technological tools that can assist 
with this work. 
This Article proceeds in six parts.  Part I recounts the history that led to the 
enactment of Section 702.  This part describes how SIGINT collection under 
Section 702 operates and analyzes why this has been such an enormously 
important intelligence authority.  Part II describes the technological 
developments that could change how the United States conducts SIGINT in the 
future.  The increased prevalence of anonymity technologies, increased 
prevalence of location-spoofing technologies, reduction in the United States’ 
home field advantage, and technological innovations by companies that reduce 
their ability to comply with government surveillance orders all challenge the 
effectiveness of Section 702. 
Part III proposes strategies to address the difficulties in accurately 
determining location presented by anonymity and location-spoofing 
technologies.  This part analyzes several legislative and procedural reform 
proposals.  Part IV encourages the Intelligence Community to pursue a number 
of strategies to enhance Executive Order 12333 SIGINT collection to ensure that 
the government continues to acquire vital intelligence to protect United States 
national security interests even as Section 702 becomes less useful.  Finally, Part 
V offers concluding remarks about how the United States should reform the laws 
and procedures governing SIGINT collection and shift intelligence collection 
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and analysis efforts under Executive Order 12333 to protect United States 
national security interests. 
I. THE ORIGINS AND IMPORTANCE OF SECTION 702 
A. The History of Section 702 
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, President George 
W. Bush authorized the NSA to collect the contents of international 
communications between people inside and outside the United States without a 
FISC order under the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP).6  In 2005, the New 
York Times revealed the existence of the TSP and the program faced numerous 
legal challenges.7  The original FISA statute had defined electronic surveillance 
to include the acquisition of the contents of wire communication when at least 
one party is in the United States and the collection itself occurs in the United 
States, and compelled the government to obtain approval from the FISC to 
conduct electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes inside the 
United States.8  The original FISA statute required the government to establish 
probable cause that “the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power 
or an agent of a foreign power;” probable cause that “each of the facilities or 
places at which the electronic surveillance is directed is being used, or is about 
to be used, by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power;” that the “proposed 
minimization procedures” are consistent with the statutory requirements; and 
that the information could not “reasonably be obtained by normal investigative 
techniques.”9  The President relied on his inherent Article II authority under the 
Constitution as the Commander in Chief and sole organ of the country to conduct 
foreign affairs, and the existence of the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military 
Force (AUMF) as legal justifications for the TSP, which appeared to be 
inconsistent with FISA.10 
                                                     
 6. OIG, DOD, REPORT ON SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM, supra note 1, at 4–14. 
 7. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 16, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/bush-lets-us-spy-on-callers-
without-courts.html?mcubz=0; e.g., ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 782 (E.D. Mich. 2006) 
(holding that the TSP violated the First and Fourth Amendments), vacated, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 
2007); see ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding that the plaintiffs lacked 
standing and reversing the district court’s decision). 
 8. FISA § 101(f)(2), 92 Stat. at 1785, 1790. 
 9. Id. §§ 104–05, 92 Stat. 1790.  Minimization procedures are a set of rules that dictate how 
a government agency will limit the accessibility, retention, and dissemination of inadvertently 
acquired material concerning United States persons who are not the target of the surveillance.  § 
101(h). 
 10. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITY SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE 
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT 2 (2006),  
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2006/01/31/nsa-white-paper.pdf. 
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In January 2007, the government sought and obtained an order from the FISC 
authorizing the government to conduct certain electronic surveillance when “the 
government made a probable cause determination regarding one of the 
communicants, and the email addresses and telephone numbers to be tasked 
were reasonably believed to be used by persons located outside the United 
States.”11  When the government sought to renew this order in May 2007, a 
different FISC judge approved the program, but under a different legal theory, 
which required changes to the program.  The May 2007 FISC order required that 
the FISC, instead of the government, make the probable cause determination.12  
This ruling led NSA analysts to be “significantly divert[ed] . . . from their 
counterterrorism mission to provide information to the Court,” and then-Director 
of National Intelligence (DNI) Vice Admiral (Ret.) Mike McConnell determined 
that it “degraded capabilities in the face of a heightened terrorist threat 
environment.”13 
In addition to the TSP, the government used FISA to obtain court orders, 
based on probable cause, authorizing surveillance against individuals suspected 
of engaging in terrorist activities located outside the United States who used 
United States-based communications service providers. 14   The government 
expended “considerable resources” to meet FISA’s requirement that it 
demonstrate there was probable cause to believe that these individuals were 
agents of a foreign power, which included international terrorist organizations, 
and used the specific communication facility that the government sought to 
surveil.15  The necessity of drafting applications that met the probable cause 
standard “slowed down and in some cases prevented the acquisition of foreign 
intelligence information.” 16   Then-DNI McConnell complained that it took 
                                                     
 11. PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE SURVEILLANCE 
PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
SURVEILLANCE ACT 17 (2014), 
https://www.nsa.gov/about/civilliberties/resources/assets/files/pclob_section_702_report.pdf 
[hereinafter PCLOB, REPORT ON SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM]; 
see also Certification of Michael B. Mukasey, Att’y Gen. of the United States at para. 37, In re 
NSA Telecomms. Records Litig. (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2014) (No. 4:08-cv-04373-JSW), ECF No. 
219, 
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/0505/AG%20Mukasey%202008%20Declassified%20Decla
ration.pdf [hereinafter AG Mukasey Certification]. 
 12. PCLOB, REPORT ON SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM, supra note 11, at 17; AG Mukasey 
Certification, supra note 11, at para. 38. 
 13. S. SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 
1978 AMENDMENTS ACTS OF 2007, S. REP. NO. 110-209, at 5 (2007). 
 14. Modernizing the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Hearing on S. 110-399 Before S. 
Select Comm. on Intelligence, 110th Cong. 29–30 (2007) (statement of Kenneth L. Wainstein, 
Assistant Att’y Gen., Nat’l Sec. Div., Dep’t of Justice) [hereinafter Hearing on Modernizing FISA]. 
 15. Id. 
 16. PCLOB, REPORT ON SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM, supra note 11, at 18. 
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“about 200 man hours to do [a FISA application for] one telephone number.”17  
The targeted individuals were foreigners, though, and were not intended to be 
protected by FISA when the statute was originally enacted in 1978.  FISA was 
intended to provide privacy protections for Americans and guard against 
domestic political abuse, not protect foreigners whose only connection to the 
United States was that they were using United States-based communications 
service providers.18  Yet, technology had evolved in a manner that could not have 
been foreseen by FISA’s drafters and the statute was implicated by intelligence 
collection efforts directed at individuals outside the United States. 
When FISA was originally enacted, domestic communications were almost 
entirely carried on a wire and international communications were wireless, radio 
communications. 19   FISA therefore closely regulated the collection of wire 
communications and less-stringently regulated the collection of radio 
communications. 20  However, technology shifted and international 
communications mostly traveled over physical cables—especially fiber optic 
cables—and domestic communications increasingly became transmitted 
wirelessly.21  This meant that FISA ended up covering a significant amount of 
foreign intelligence collection activities targeting foreigners overseas that the 
statute was never actually intended to cover because of the statute’s focus on 
how a communication was transmitted and where it was intercepted.  Further, 
there was an enormous increase in commercial technologies that consumers 
could use, and consumers were able to use and change e-mail addresses and 
telephone numbers frequently across services.22  This created 
a significant challenge for intelligence services which, under FISA 
1978, had to obtain explicit approval for each and every selector they 
wanted to target.  In 2008, there was a growing body of evidence that 
terrorists were making effective use of this agility, acquiring and 
                                                     
 17. Chris Roberts, Transcript: Debate on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, EL PASO 
TIMES (Aug. 22, 2007, 1:05 AM), https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/att/ 
elpasotimesmcconnelltranscript.pdf. 
 18. See H.R. PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978 AMENDMENTS ACTS OF 1978, H.R. REP. NO. 95-1283, at 68 (1978) 
(describing the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence’s (HPSCI) consensus view that 
a “judicial warrant should be required whenever the [F]ourth [A]mendment rights of Americans 
might be involved”); RICHARD A. CLARKE ET AL., LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING 
WORLD: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP ON 
INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES 67–68, (2013),  
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-12-12_rg_final_report.pdf 
(describing FISA’s safeguards against domestic misuse and politicization). 
 19. Hearing on Modernizing FISA, supra note 14, at 29. 
 20. CHRIS INGLIS & JEFF KOSSEFF, HOOVER INST., IN DEFENSE OF FAA SECTION 702 5 
(2016), https://www.hoover.org/research/defense-faa-section-702. 
 21. Hearing on Modernizing FISA, supra note 14, at 29; INGLIS & KOSSEFF, supra note 20, 
at 5. 
 22. INGLIS & KOSSEFF, supra note 20, at 5. 
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shedding e-mail addresses and telephone numbers faster than US 
intelligence services could prepare, submit, and obtain required 
selector-by-selector approvals.23 
In addition to the challenges posed by shifts in technology that rendered the 
original FISA outdated, global communications had evolved in a way that 
offered the United States a “home field” advantage.24  Internet traffic was broken 
own into packets, which were transmitted based on the most efficient path, rather 
than linear geographic path between the sender and recipient.25  Packets could 
travel around the world en route from the sender to the recipient, which 
presented the United States with a tremendous intelligence collection 
opportunity because a large amount of Internet traffic passed through equipment 
physically located in the United States.26  This provided the United States with 
an opportunity to obtain foreign intelligence targets’ communications from a 
stable and safe domestic environment instead of difficult circumstances 
overseas.27   The Bush administration ultimately proposed modifications to 
FISA in spring 2007.28  Congress passed the PAA to authorize the TSP by 
ensuring that “electronic surveillance” would not be defined to include 
“surveillance directed at a person reasonably believed to be located outside of 
the United States.”29  Under the PAA, the FISC no longer had jurisdiction over 
surveillance targeted at such individuals.  Instead, the DNI and the Attorney 
General had the power to authorize such surveillance, and the FISC’s only role 
was to ensure that the procedures for determining the surveillance was targeted 
at persons reasonably believed to be outside the United States were not “clearly 
erroneous.”30 
Congress then passed the FAA when the PAA expired to enable the 
government to target non-United States “persons reasonably believed to be 
located outside the United States to acquire foreign intelligence information.”31  
Unlike traditional FISA surveillance, surveillance under Section 702 of the FAA 
did not require a probable cause standard that the target was a foreign power or 
                                                     
 23. Id. 
 24. FISA for the 21st Century: Hearing on S. 109-1055 Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
109th Cong. 6–10 (2006) (statement of Michael V. Hayden, Dir., Cent. Intelligence Agency) 
[hereinafter FISA for the 21st Century Hearing]. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id.; John Markoff, Internet Traffic Begins to Bypass the U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/30/business/30pipes.html. 
 27. See FISA for the 21st Century Hearing, supra note 24, at 9; INGLIS & KOSSEFF, supra 
note 20, at 4. 
 28. PCLOB, REPORT ON SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM, supra note 11, at 19. 
 29. Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, § 105A, 121 Stat. 552, 552 (codified 
as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1805a (2007)). 
 30. Id. § 105C(c), 121 Stat. at 555. 
 31. FISA § 702, 122 Stat. at 2438. 
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agent of a foreign power and did not require individual FISC orders.32  Section 
702 only required the Attorney General and DNI to obtain approval for the 
targeting procedures, minimization procedures, and certifications from the 
FISC, which then enabled the government to compel cooperation by issuing 
directives to companies. 33   The legal standard under Section 702 was less 
stringent than FISA Title I surveillance, which was focused primarily on United 
States persons, and the judicial oversight occurred less frequently than under 
FISA Title I.  Once the government obtained certification from the FISC under 
Section 702, the government could then issue directives to private sector 
companies to compel the companies to cooperate with the government in the 
surveillance.34 
B. How Section 702 Operates 
Under Section 702, NSA analysts identify non-United States persons who are 
reasonably believed to be located outside the United States as potential targets 
for gathering foreign intelligence regarding a purpose that the FISC has certified.  
Analysts apply the NSA’s targeting procedures “to make a determination 
regarding the assessed location and non-U.S. person status of the potential target 
(the foreignness determination) and whether the target possesses and/or is likely 
to communicate or receive foreign intelligence information authorized under an 
approved certification (the foreign intelligence purpose determination).”35 
The analyst must first identify the specific selector (such as an email address 
or telephone number) that is used by the target.36  The analyst then checks to 
verify that the target is indeed a non-United States person reasonably believed 
to be located outside the United States and that the target is connected to the 
selector. 37   The foreignness determination is based on the “totality of the 
circumstances” and NSA analysts must consult multiple sources in making the 
determination.38  NSA procedures require “analysts [to] conduct ‘due diligence’” 
                                                     
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. § 702(d), (e), (g), 122 Stat. at 2439. 
 34. Id. § 702(h), 122 Stat. at 2442. 
 35. PCLOB, REPORT ON SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM, supra note 11, at 43. 
 36. INGLIS & KOSSEFF, supra note 20, at 10. 
 37. NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, PROCEDURES USED BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY FOR 
TARGETING NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS REASONABLY BELIEVED TO BE LOCATED OUTSIDE 
THE UNITED STATES TO ACQUIRE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 
702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978, AS AMENDED 1 (2018), 
https://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2018_Cert_NSA
_Targeting_27Mar18.pdf [hereinafter NSA, TARGETING PROCEDURES 2018].  See INGLIS & 
KOSSEFF, supra note 20, at 10. 
 38. PCLOB, REPORT ON SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM, supra note 11, at 43; see NSA, 
TARGETING PROCEDURES 2018, supra note 37, at 1. 
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in making the foreignness determination. 39   The Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Oversight Board (PCLOB) has recognized that 
[w]hat constitutes due diligence will vary depending on the target; 
tasking a new selector used by a foreign intelligence target with whom 
the NSA is already quite familiar may not require deep research into 
the target’s (already known) U.S. person status and current location, 
while a great deal more effort may be required to target a previously 
unknown, and more elusive, individual.40 
The NSA has specifically used an Internet Protocol (IP) filter with at least 
“upstream” collection to limit acquisition “to Internet transactions that originate 
and/or terminate outside the United States.”41  If there is conflicting information 
regarding whether the target is located inside the United States or is a United 
States person, the conflict “must be resolved,” and the analysts must determine 
that the potential target is a “non-U.S. person reasonably believed to be located 
outside the United States prior to targeting.”42  In making the foreign intelligence 
purpose determination, NSA analysts must determine “that the target is expected 
to possess, receive, and/or is likely to communicate foreign intelligence 
information concerning a foreign power or foreign territory.”43  NSA analysts 
must document their foreignness determinations and foreign intelligence purpose 
determinations, and two senior NSA analysts must approve the request before a 
service provider may be compelled to provide the communications associated 
with a tasked selector.44 
After a selector has been tasked, the selector is sent to an electronic 
communications service provider so that acquisition can occur. 45   Two 
collection programs comprise Section 702 acquisition: “downstream” collection 
(which was formerly referred to as PRISM) and “upstream” collection.  With 
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downstream collection, the government compels an electronic communications 
service provider to turn over the communications that are sent “to” or “from” a 
specific selector. 46   Under upstream collection, the government compels 
companies that operate “the telecommunications ‘backbone’ over which 
telephone and Internet communications transit” to turn over communications that 
are sent “to” or “from” (and formerly “about”) a specific selector.47 
The NSA’s targeting procedures also require post-tasking analysis to ensure 
that the person targeted remains a non-United States person overseas and that 
acquisition against the tasked selector only continues to the extent that the 
government assesses the tasking is likely to acquire foreign intelligence 
information.48  Analysts must review content for indications that a target is a 
United States person, has entered the United States, or intends to enter the United 
States.49  To ensure that analysts conduct this review, “[t]he NSA has developed 
automated systems to remind analysts to review collection from email addresses 
and comparable selectors within five business days after the first instance that 
data is acquired for a particular tasked selector, and at least every 30 days 
thereafter.”50  If the NSA determines that a person that was first “reasonably 
believed to be located outside the United States” was actually inside the United 
States after targeting, or if the NSA determines that a person “believed to be a 
non-United States person” was actually a United States person after targeting, the 
NSA must promptly detask the selectors used by that individual, which 
terminates the acquisition directed at those selectors.51  The data acquired from a 
selector that the NSA learned after targeting was used by a United States person 
or person located inside the United States is destroyed unless the Director of the 
NSA determines—on a communication-by-communication basis—that the 
sender or intended recipient had been properly targeted and the “communication 
is reasonably believed to contain significant foreign intelligence information,” “is 
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reasonably believed to contain evidence of a crime,” is reasonably believed to 
contain data to be used for cryptanalytic purposes or technical information 
necessary to understand a communications security vulnerability, or “contains 
information pertaining to an imminent threat of serious harm to life or 
property.”52  The NSA may notify “the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] that 
a target has entered the United States so that the FBI may seek [a] traditional 
FISA [Title I order] or take other lawful investigative steps.”53 
C. The Importance of Section 702 
Section 702 is likely the most important statutory tool for intelligence 
collection, particularly on terrorism, and is vital for protecting United States 
national security.54  In 2018, there were more than 164,000 Section 702 targets.55  
Section 702 enables the Intelligence Community to collect intelligence on non-
United States persons that it reasonably believes are overseas when it reasonably 
believes it will acquire foreign intelligence from surveilling these individuals.  
The Intelligence Community is not required to establish probable cause that the 
targeted individual is an agent of a foreign power, nor that each facility is being 
used or is about to be used by a foreign power or agent of a foreign power, nor 
that the information could not be reasonably obtained by normal investigative 
methods.56  The probable cause requirement in FISA Title I is a protection 
derived from the Fourth Amendment, but non-United States persons that are 
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United States persons reasonably believed to be overseas to acquire foreign intelligence 
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reasonably believed to be overseas are not entitled to Fourth Amendment 
protections.57  Without Section 702, the Intelligence Community would likely 
be unable to amass sufficient information to establish probable cause against 
many of these targets and the United States would lose a significant amount of 
critical intelligence because it extended privacy protections to non-United States 
persons that were never intended for their protection.  Even if the Intelligence 
Community could establish probable cause against some of these targets, the 
Intelligence Community would need to expend significant resources to meet this 
high standard, and such resource expenditure would take away from other 
critical national security missions and the entire process would cause delays in 
collection that could be harmful.58  The Intelligence Community would simply 
not be able to maintain nearly the same level of intelligence collection without 
Section 702.59 
Further, Section 702 allows for collection to occur in a stable and safe 
domestic environment.  Under downstream collection, the communications “to” 
and “from” a selector are even provided to the NSA in a manner that is highly 
likely to yield intact copies of the entirety of the communications.60  While 
Executive Order 12333 authorizes the NSA to collect SIGINT abroad on non-
United States persons and accounts for the vast majority of SIGINT collected 
globally, collection under Executive Order 12333 is often accomplished in a 
more difficult and less safe environment, and often results in obtaining packets 
of communications instead of entire communications.61  Therefore, Section 702 
provides a more precise, complete, and safe collection authority than Executive 
Order 12333.  Also, Section 702 collection occurs by the compelled assistance 
of United States electronic communications service providers, which means that 
the government does not have to risk exposing its sensitive sources and methods 
to obtain such information, which it risks exposing under Executive Order 12333 
collection.62  Finally, the PCLOB has found that 
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acquiring communications with the compelled assistance of U.S. 
companies allows service providers and the government to manage the 
manner in which the collection occurs.  By helping to prevent 
incidents of overcollection and swiftly remedy problems that do occur, 
this arrangement can benefit the privacy of people whose 
communications are at risk of being acquired mistakenly.63 
II. TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS THAT COULD CHANGE HOW THE 
UNITED STATES CONDUCTS SIGINT 
Section 702 was a critical intelligence collection reform that belatedly 
addressed technological developments to enable the Intelligence Community to 
acquire important foreign intelligence to protect United States national security 
interests and inform policymakers.  While the collection programs under Section 
702 have produced a great deal of valuable intelligence over the last decade, the 
United States must begin to think about foreseeable technological developments 
and strategically consider how to conduct SIGINT collection in the future. 
Individuals now have access to sophisticated technologies that formerly only 
governments seemed capable of creating.  This decentralization of capabilities 
is a trend that will likely only increase in the future.  While access to new 
technologies produces innovation, improves daily life, and aides human rights 
activists living under oppressive regimes, these same technologies can be 
utilized by malign actors to conduct illicit activities.64  Two trends that may 
benefit individual users while creating difficulties for the United States 
Intelligence Community are the increased prevalence of anonymity and 
location-spoofing technologies. 
Also, the United States’ home field advantage is shrinking.65  This trend 
means that the United States will have a smaller share of the world’s 
communications traffic transit its physical infrastructure, which will reduce the 
Intelligence Community’s ability to acquire precise and intact communications 
by serving directives on United States companies.66  The possible balkanization 
of the Internet through data localization laws may exacerbate this trend 
threatening the United States’ home field advantage. 
Further, technology companies have begun to innovate in a manner that 
reduces their capability to respond to lawful orders.  Technology companies 
have increasingly adopted encryption technologies and may shift data overseas 
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to try to avoid complying with lawful surveillance orders in the United States.67  
Following Snowden’s unauthorized disclosures regarding United States 
intelligence activities, United States based technology companies have viewed 
it as being in their interest to take more adversarial stances in their relationships 
with the United States government to protect market share and maintain 
consumer confidence, especially among foreign consumers.68   Decisions by 
major private sector technology companies, who may view themselves primarily 
as global enterprises and may not necessarily be predisposed to serve the United 
States government’s interests, have the remarkable ability to shape how SIGINT 
is collected. 
A. Anonymity Technologies 
The increased prevalence and advancement of anonymity technologies may 
create difficulties for the Intelligence Community in its foreignness 
determinations and post-tasking analysis.  Anonymity tools intentionally hide 
users’ real identities and locations, and provide individuals with ways to 
circumvent censorship.69  These products can be enormously useful to human 
rights activists, dissidents, and journalists living under oppressive regimes, as 
well as provide privacy protections for individuals.70  At the same time, the 
information about a user’s true identity and location that are masked by 
anonymity tools can be critical for the NSA’s ability to lawfully target 
individuals under Section 702. 
Tor is one of the most prominent anonymity technologies and serves as a good 
example for understanding how these technologies operate.  Tor enables users 
to access the Internet anonymously and browse the Internet in such a way that the 
computer the user is ultimately communicating with does not know who the user 
is or where the user is physically located—the user’s Internet traffic instead 
appears to originate from the Tor server.71  Individuals connect to Tor and the 
packets of data that travel from the user’s computer to the recipient computer 
travel an encrypted path through relay nodes.72  Relay nodes are computers that 
are scattered across the world whose owners have also installed Tor and 
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volunteered their computers to serve as proxies that route data packets.73  Users 
connecting to Tor randomly select a path of Tor nodes to perform 
communications.74  When the user sends their message over the Tor network, the 
message first travels to an entry node over an encrypted link.75  The entry node 
only knows that the user is connecting to that entry node and that the user has a 
message that the entry node must pass along to the middle node, but the entry 
node does not know the content of the message or the message’s final recipient 
because this information is encrypted.76  Next, the middle node receives the 
message from the entry node, but only knows that the message came from the 
entry node and that it must pass the message to the exit node.77  The middle node 
does not know who the message originated with, the message’s final recipient, or 
the content of the message because this information is encrypted. 78  
Subsequently, the exit node receives the message from the middle node, but only 
knows that the message came from the middle node and that it must pass the 
message to the recipient.79  The exit node does not know who the message 
originated with or the content of the message—as long as the connection 
between the exit node and ultimate recipient is also encrypted.80  Finally, the 
recipient receives the message from the exit node and can decrypt the content of 
the message.81  This means that the user’s Internet traffic appears to originate 
from the exit node, which is a proxy computer, rather than from the original 
user’s computer.82  This hides the user’s IP address, which is a unique identifier 
that identifies the user’s computer and can be used with a high degree of 
accuracy to determine the location of the user.83  Also, the traffic emanating 
from the user’s computer appears to be going only to the entry node—a proxy 
computer—rather than the actual final destination from the perspective of the 
Internet service provider (ISP).84  Tor updates its circuits frequently so the user 
connects to different entry nodes and different exit nodes send the Internet traffic 
to its final destination.85 
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An individual that is located in the United States and using an anonymity 
technology, such as Tor, will appear to be located in another country from the 
perspective of the destination computer—which is likely a webpage—if the exit 
node is located in another country.  Similarly, an individual using this 
technology that is located outside of the United States will appear to be located 
inside the United States from the perspective of the destination computer if the 
exit node is located inside the United States.  An individual will appear to the 
ISP to be communicating only with the entry node and the ISP will not know 
that the individual ultimately communicated with the destination computer. 
Further, individuals can “host content or services without exposing the 
physical location of their servers” by using Tor’s onion services, which were 
formerly known as hidden services.86  Onion services are only accessible on the 
Tor network and users can only communicate with an onion service through a 
rendezvous point on the Tor network.87 
Anonymity technologies have become more prevalent in recent years.  The 
number of Tor users increased from under one million users prior to the 
Snowden disclosures to nearly six million users just after the disclosures, and is 
currently about two million users as of March 2020.88  In 2014, a survey of 
Internet users across twenty-four countries conducted by the Centre for 
International Governance Innovation showed that 60% of Internet users had 
heard about Edward Snowden and that 39% of those aware of Snowden reported 
taking steps to protect their security and privacy online as a result of the 
disclosures.89  Bruce Schneier, an American security technologist, calculated that 
the data from this survey indicated that over 700 million people across the world 
may have taken steps to try to improve their security and privacy online in the 
aftermath of the Snowden disclosures.90  Many of these people are likely not 
sophisticated technology users, but this demonstrates that there is growing 
awareness of the surveillance activities that intelligence services engage in, and 
there is a significant segment of the global population that desires greater 
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protections against such activities.  People’s desire for greater security and 
privacy online is likely also driven by the increased awareness of the extent of 
information that private companies collect about users to use for advertising 
purposes and the increased awareness of cybercrime.91  This may drive more 
people to use anonymity technologies, at least for sensitive online activities.  
Also, malicious actors, such as terrorist organizations, have learned from the 
Snowden disclosures and adjusted their tradecraft to attempt to thwart United 
States intelligence.92  Guidelines for how to use Tor have been distributed on an 
al-Qaeda affiliated forum, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) has 
advised its followers to use Tor when engaging in propaganda activities and 
communicating with other terrorists, and ISIS has reportedly launched 
propaganda sites using Tor’s onion services.93 
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Anonymity technologies may present difficulties for the NSA in conducting 
surveillance under Section 702 because the statute only permits the NSA to 
target non-United States persons that are reasonably believed to be overseas.  
Anonymity technologies disguise users’ true IP addresses, which are critical 
pieces of information that can be used to identify individual’s locations.  The 
NSA may therefore have difficulty in determining whether a potential target is 
a United States person or non-United States person and whether the potential 
target is inside the United States or overseas.  There will likely be many 
occasions when the information that leads analysts to determine that there is a 
valid foreign intelligence reason to target a person includes information about 
the person’s citizenship and location, which would alleviate the difficulties 
arising from having to make a foreignness determination based solely on 
information that is transmitted using anonymity technologies, but this may not 
always be the case. 
For example, targeting may be based on an intelligence officer’s interaction 
with a person on a terrorist chat forum.94  The person’s presence and activities 
in the chat forum may provide the officer with a reasonable belief that the 
individual “is expected to possess, receive, and/or is likely to communicate 
foreign intelligence information.”95  The officer can then analyze the available 
information regarding the potential target, such as, the language they use and 
time of day that they log onto the chat forum, as indicators of the person’s status 
and location.96  The officer may also review information in the NSA’s databases 
to see if information regarding the person’s location is already known. 97  
Sophisticated actors could use anonymity technologies and employ tradecraft 
techniques to attempt to hide their identities and locations, which could require 
NSA analysts to devote significant time and resources to determining whether 
specific users are legitimate targets under Section 702. 
Currently, the NSA is allowed “to make reasonable presumptions regarding a 
target’s foreignness” based on the information that is available.98  The NSA 
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their communications and location data). 
 94. Interview with Matt Tait, Cybersecurity Senior Fellow, Robert S. Strauss Ctr. for Int’l 
Sec. & Law, in Austin, Tex. (Feb. 8, 2018). 
 95. NSA, TARGETING PROCEDURES 2017, supra note 41, at 4. 
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likely makes the presumption that an individual whose actual location cannot be 
determined is outside the United States and assumes that a person whose location 
is unknown is a non-United States person unless that person can be positively 
identified as a United States person “or the nature or circumstances of the 
person’s communications give rise to a reasonable belief that such person is a 
United States person.”99  The FISC has noted that the NSA only makes such 
presumptions of foreignness after it has exercised due diligence in attempting to 
determine the potential target’s location.100 
These presumptions are consistent with the statute’s requirement that the 
Attorney General and DNI 
adopt targeting procedures that are reasonably designed to– 
(A) ensure that any acquisition authorized under [Section 
702] is limited to targeting persons reasonably believed to 
be located outside the United States; and 
(B) prevent the intentional acquisition of any 
communication as to which the sender and all intended 
recipients are known at the time of the acquisition to be 
located in the United States.101 
When the NSA cannot determine the location of a potential target, such as when 
a user consistently uses anonymity technologies, after exercising due diligence 
then it is reasonable to assume that the person is not inside the United States, as 
there is no information that indicates the person is inside the United States.  Also, 
the NSA would clearly not be intentionally acquiring communications to or from 
a person known at the time of acquisition to be located in the United States as 
the NSA would not know the person’s location at the time of acquisition. 
The NSA’s presumptions are also consistent with the Fourth Amendment.  
The Fourth Amendment asserts that: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.102 
The Supreme Court has recognized that the warrant clause does not apply in 
certain circumstances “when special needs, beyond the normal need for law 
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enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirements 
impracticable.”103  The Supreme Court has not addressed whether a similar 
exception applies for foreign intelligence surveillance.  In Katz,104 the Court 
noted in a footnote that its decision requiring the authorization of a magistrate 
based on a showing of probable cause prior to engaging in electronic 
surveillance to satisfy the Fourth Amendment did not determine whether the 
same analysis would extend to situations involving national security, which 
would include intelligence surveillance.105  The Court continued to leave open 
the question of whether the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant when 
intelligence investigations concern foreign powers even when it determined that 
domestic surveillance required appropriate prior warrant procedure in Keith.106  
Foreign intelligence surveillance serves a purpose beyond traditional law 
enforcement objectives and is a vital tool for protecting national security.  The 
Supreme Court has noted that “[i]t is ‘obvious and unarguable’ that no 
governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.”107  The 
government’s interest is therefore particularly strong in the foreign intelligence 
context.  If the government was required to obtain a warrant prior to engaging in 
foreign intelligence surveillance, the government would be hindered in its “ability 
to collect time-sensitive information” and the government’s “vital national 
security interests that are at stake” would be impeded.108  This has led multiple 
federal appeals courts and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review 
(FISCR) to recognize that there is a foreign intelligence exception to the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant requirement.109  The government’s action must therefore 
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comply with the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement to be 
constitutional. 
In determining whether a government action is reasonable, courts must 
consider the totality of the circumstances.110  Courts “weigh ‘the promotion of 
legitimate governmental interests’ against ‘the degree to which [the search] 
intrudes upon an individual’s privacy.’” 111   The government’s action is 
reasonable in the situation where the NSA discovers a potential target that an 
analyst determines “is expected to possess, receive, and/or is likely to 
communicate foreign intelligence information concerning a foreign power or 
foreign territory,” and that potential target is using an anonymity technology like 
Tor to successfully mask their identity and physical location.112  The government 
clearly has an extraordinarily strong interest in collecting foreign intelligence 
information and the NSA has assessed that surveilling the potential target would 
likely result in the acquisition of foreign intelligence in this situation.  The NSA 
only makes a presumptions of foreignness after it has exercised due diligence in 
attempting to determine the potential target’s location. 113   Under Verdugo-
Urquidez,114 the Fourth Amendment does not apply to the searches of foreigners 
outside the United States.115  Thus, an individual presumed to be a non-United 
States person overseas does not have privacy interests protected by the Fourth 
Amendment.  However, the individual does suffer a severe privacy intrusion that 
is protected under the Fourth Amendment if the individual is actually a United 
States person or is located inside the United States.  The NSA’s Section 702 
procedures provide important protections that reduce this intrusiveness.  If the 
NSA discovers that this person was actually inside the United States or was 
actually a United States person after targeting, the NSA must promptly detask 
the selectors used by the individual, which terminates the acquisition directed at 
those selectors.116  The data acquired from these selectors would be promptly 
destroyed, too, unless the Director of the NSA made a specific determination 
that an exception applied. 117   These measures provide back-end privacy 
protections for United States persons or individuals that are actually located 
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inside the United States that are presumed to be foreigners and targeted based 
on their actions warranting a foreign intelligence purpose determination that 
occur over the Tor network.  The NSA’s actions are ultimately reasonable and 
therefore constitutional in such a circumstance. 
The real difficulty for the NSA may be in the post-tasking analysis, rather than 
in targeting.  The NSA requires that analysts review information for indications 
that a target is a United States person, has entered the United States, or intends 
to enter the United States.118  When a target uses anonymity technologies like 
Tor, the target may appear to be located in different locations depending on 
where the nodes are located at any given time.119  There may be instances where 
the communications acquired from an electronic communications service 
provider under downstream or Internet transactions acquired from companies that 
operate the “the telecommunications ‘backbone’ over which telephone and 
Internet communications transit” under upstream indicate that the target is located 
inside the United States if the Tor nodes are located inside the United States.120  
NSA analysts must determine if such information indicates that the target is 
actually a United States person or is actually inside the United States, which 
would require detasking, or if the target is only appearing to be present inside the 
United States because they are using an anonymity technology.121  This may be 
a resource intensive endeavor for NSA analysts that leads analysts to spend 
valuable time trying to determine if the target can continue to be lawfully targeted 
under Section 702.  This would inevitably reduce the amount of time that analysts 
could spend on other important national security matters.  The post-tasking 
analysis may result in detasking selectors that appear to be being used by a target 
inside the United States.  While the NSA may notify the FBI that a target has 
appeared to enter the United States so that the FBI may seek a traditional FISA 
Title I order or take other lawful investigative steps, there may not be enough 
information to meet the higher legal standards to proceed with these other 
investigative measures.122 
Although the NSA must have determined the person was “expected to 
possess, receive, and/or is likely to communicate foreign intelligence 
information concerning a foreign power or foreign territory”123 in order to target 
them under Section 702, there may not be enough information to establish 
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probable cause that the target is an agent of a foreign power to obtain a FISA 
Title I order, or “probable cause for belief that an individual is committing, has 
committed, or is about to commit” an enumerated crime to obtain a court order 
to intercept wire, oral, and electronic communications under Title III of the 
Omnibus Crime and Safe Streets Act of 1968. 124   This means that the 
Intelligence Community would lose the ability to collect on the target, and 
therefore lose potentially important insight into a terrorist group, foreign 
country, or other illicit actor.  Even if there is enough information to obtain 
probable cause under one of these legal mechanisms, it requires significant 
resources and time to put together sufficient FISA Title I and Title III 
applications.125 
If anonymity tools become more prevalent and such post-tasking problems 
become more common, this would pose a serious problem for the Intelligence 
Community.  Trying to establish probable cause on a significant number of 
targets that appear to now be located within the United States after originally 
appearing to be non-United States persons overseas when they were first 
targeted would require the government to use a significant amount of resources, 
which would take way from other important national security missions, and 
cause delays in intelligence collection.  In addition, even if it were later 
discovered that the target was using an anonymity technology, such as Tor, and 
not actually inside the United States, which would allow for the selector to be 
tasked once again, any communications that occurred during the intervening 
time after the selector was detasked and before the selector was re-tasked would 
not be collected and would be lost to the Intelligence Community. 
However, there is reason to doubt that anonymity technologies will become 
widespread to the point where they may cause significant problems for the 
NSA.126  Anonymity tools like Tor are not simple to use and will always be 
rather slow because users’ traffic must bounce through volunteers’ proxy 
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computers in different parts of the world.127  There are also bottlenecks caused 
by the network not having enough nodes, especially exit nodes, to handle all of 
the traffic.128  Currently, people volunteer their computers to serve as nodes, but 
this uses bandwidth and therefore costs these people money to provide a service 
for others using the network.129  Middle nodes have no opportunity to see content 
in anonymity technologies and therefore cannot even try to monetize access to 
such information by selling it to advertisers as this would defeat the purpose of 
anonymity technologies.130  It is difficult to see how a company would monetize 
an anonymity technology product other than by having users pay for it, which 
could generate revenue to pay for computers to serve as nodes.  But many people 
may not be willing to pay for such products.131  Also, it can be especially difficult 
to get enough people to volunteer to run exit nodes.132  When illicit actors use Tor 
to engage in criminal activity, like accessing child pornography websites, it is the 
exit node’s IP address that appears to be connecting to the final website.133  This 
means that the person running the exit node can get embroiled in criminal 
investigations.134  This risk reduces the number of people that are willing to 
serve as exit nodes, which exacerbates the bottleneck issue that is part of what 
slows anonymity technologies.  It is still possible that an Internet browser could 
create an anonymity technology and could compete with other major Internet 
browsers, such as Google Chrome and Mozilla Firefox, but it seems unlikely 
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that anonymity technologies will become as ubiquitous as encryption 
technologies have become.135 
Further, people often reveal information about themselves even when using 
anonymity technologies.136  People have a natural desire to want to be connected 
with others and therefore often use social media and email, which can provide 
information regarding a person’s true identity and location.137  Many people do 
not necessarily want to remain anonymous all the time.138 
Nonetheless, these technologies can still currently pose problems for the NSA 
and the increased prevalence of anonymity technologies will likely make the 
NSA’s work more difficult, especially with malign actors who use sophisticated 
tradecraft.  Also, these bad actors will become more difficult to surveil as other 
innocent users decide to use anonymity technologies because this enables the 
malicious actors to hide among innocent users. 
B. Location-Spoofing Technologies 
The increased prevalence of location-spoofing technologies, such as virtual 
private networks (VPNs), may create more severe difficulties for the NSA than 
anonymity technologies.  VPNs encrypt and relay Internet communications from 
a user’s computer to another computer, where the communications are then 
decrypted and sent on to their final destination.139  This makes it appear as if the 
communications are actually coming from the intermediary computer, which can 
be run by a VPN service, instead of the original user.140  Thus, “the user’s 
apparent IP address corresponds to the VPN server, which may or may not be in 
the same country as the user.”141  VPNs are used by businesses so that employees 
can securely access internal resources; by ordinary people to protect their 
privacy and protect their personal data from being stolen by cyber criminals; and 
to defeat censorship through geo-blocking, which is a location-based restriction 
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on the access to certain Internet content that depends on IP addresses to filter 
users.142 
Location-spoofing technologies like VPNs are much more common than 
anonymity technologies and are becoming more widely adopted.  VPNs are 
more user-friendly than anonymity technologies and we may very well see a 
trend in the adoption of VPNs that mirrors the adoption of encryption 
technologies, which have increasingly become the default on many devices.143  
In the fourth quarter of 2016, a Global Web Index survey found that 30% of 
global Internet users stated that they used a VPN or proxy server when accessing 
the Internet, which was an increase from a Global Web Index survey in the first 
quarter of 2016 that found that nearly 25% of global Internet users stated that 
they used a VPN or proxy server when accessing the Internet.144  A 2015 Global 
Web Index survey also found that 70% of VPN users reported using VPNs at 
least once a week.145  The worldwide VPN market was expected to grow from 
$45 billion in 2014 to $70 billion in 2019.146  This indicates that VPNs are 
becoming increasingly popular.147 
Adversaries may specifically use location-spoofing technologies to hide their 
true locations.  ISIS and al-Qaeda have advised their followers to use VPNs, and 
have even published detailed manuals to educate their followers about location-
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spoofing technologies and encourage their followers to use VPNs.148  Also, 
Russian actors working for the Internet Research Agency that engaged in active 
measures to meddle in United States politics and the 2016 presidential election 
“purchased space on computer servers located inside the United States in order 
to set up virtual private networks (‘VPNs’)” to make it appear as though they 
were located inside the United States to carry out their activities and influence 
operations.149  These Russian actors “connected from Russia to the U.S.-based 
infrastructure by way of these VPNs and conducted activity inside the United 
States—including accessing online social media accounts, opening new 
accounts, and communicating with real U.S. persons—while masking the 
Russian origin and control of the activity.”150 
By masking the true location of the user, location-spoofing technologies like 
VPNs may hinder the NSA’s ability to efficiently conduct SIGINT collection 
under Section 702 because location-spoofing technologies may cause problems 
for the NSA in making pre-tasking foreignness determinations and in conducting 
post-tasking analysis regarding an individual’s location.  These problems would 
be greatly exacerbated by the widespread adoption of location-spoofing 
technologies like VPNs. 
Under Section 702, the NSA may only target non-United States persons that 
are reasonably believed to be outside the United States.151  A potential target 
may consistently use VPN services that are located inside the United States.  The 
potential target’s IP address would appear to be the VPN server’s IP address and 
indicate that the potential target was located wherever the VPN server is, instead 
of revealing the potential target’s true IP address and actual location.  If the VPN 
server is inside the United States, then the potential target will appear to be 
located inside the United States even if the potential target is really overseas.  As 
discussed supra,152 there will likely be many occasions when the information 
that leads analysts to determine that there is a valid foreign intelligence reason 
to target a person includes information about the person’s citizenship and 
location, which would alleviate the difficulties arising from having to make a 
foreignness determination based solely on information that is transmitted using 
location-spoofing technologies, but this may not always be the case.  The foreign 
intelligence purpose determination may not be based on the type of information 
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that would allow analysts to make a foreignness determination from this 
information, and the NSA may not have any prior information regarding a 
potential new target in its databases to aid in the foreignness determination.153  
Further, NSA analysts are required to “exercise a standard of due diligence” in 
making the foreignness determination, and make “their determinations based on 
the totality of the circumstances.”154  The PCLOB has confirmed 
that this is not a “51% to 49% test.”  If there is conflicting information 
indicating whether a target is located in the United States or is a U.S. 
person, that conflict must be resolved and the user must be determined 
to be a non-U.S. person reasonably believed to be located outside the 
United States prior to targeting.155 
This means that NSA analysts must be able to find enough information 
indicating that a potential target is actually located overseas to overcome the 
indication from the IP address, which is truly the IP address of the VPN server, 
that a potential target is located inside the United States based on the totality of 
the circumstances.  If a significant number of potential targets use location-
spoofing technologies like VPNs as part of their tradecraft to try to avoid 
surveillance, this could require NSA analysts to expend a great deal of effort to 
uncover that a potential target is indeed located overseas.  This would limit 
analysts’ ability to engage in their other important intelligence work as 
foreignness determinations would take longer, and would cause delays in 
targeting, which means that there would be delays in the ability to actually 
collect important intelligence on these targets.156  Delays in collection could 
have severe consequences when trying to understand fast-moving and dynamic 
threats, such as terrorist organizations.157  Also, this may lead to instances in 
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which the NSA cannot resolve the conflict and adequately determine that the 
potential target is reasonably believed to be outside the United States even 
though in reality the potential target is a non-United States person overseas 
because the potential target is using tradecraft to hide the person’s true identity 
and location and using VPNs located inside the United States.158 
Location-spoofing technologies may also cause especially significant 
problems for the NSA in post-tasking analysis.  NSA analysts must review 
information to determine whether there is any indication that a target is a United 
States person, has entered the United States, or intends to enter the United 
States.159  When a target uses a VPN that is located inside the United States, the 
target’s IP address may appear to be located inside the United States even if the 
target remains overseas.160  If the NSA is heavily dependent on IP addresses to 
determine location, the use of location-spoofing technologies like VPNs could 
result in analysts having to spend significant amount of time trying to resolve 
the conflicting information about the location of the target between the time the 
person was first targeted and the current information acquired after the person 
began using the VPN.161  This could create a major resource problem for the 
NSA if there is widespread use of location-spoofing technologies like VPNs 
given the scale of SIGINT collection under Section 702, which had more than 
164,000 targets in 2018.162 
Further, this could result in the NSA having to detask targets when analysts 
cannot resolve the conflicting information and believe the target has entered the 
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United States.163  In an increasingly globalized world where a growing number 
of people travel and use mobile communications devices, it is quite believable 
that a target could have entered the United States.164  As discussed supra,165 
although the NSA may notify the FBI that a target has appeared to enter the 
United States so that the FBI may seek a traditional FISA Title I order or take 
other lawful investigative steps, there may not be enough information to 
establish probable cause that the target is an agent of a foreign power to obtain 
a FISA Title I order, or “probable cause for belief that an individual is 
committing, has committed, or is about to commit” an enumerated crime to 
obtain a court order to intercept wire, oral, and electronic communications under 
Title III.166  This means that the Intelligence Community could lose the ability to 
collect on the target.  Even if there is enough information to obtain probable cause 
under one of these legal mechanisms, it requires significant resources and time to 
put together sufficient FISA Title I and Title III applications.167  Thus, trying to 
establish probable cause on a significant number of targets that all of the sudden 
appear to be located within the United States after originally appearing to be 
overseas when they were first targeted would take way from other important 
national security missions and cause delays in intelligence collection.  Even 
though the target may be re-tasked if the NSA develops a reasonable belief that 
the person is outside the United States at a later point in time and the NSA 
continues to believe that the person possesses or is likely to communicate foreign 
intelligence information, there will be a gap in collection between the time the 
target was detasked and re-tasked despite the fact that the person may have been a 
legitimate target outside the United States the entire time.168 
C. The Reduction in the United States’ Home Field Advantage 
The United States’ home field advantage in conducting SIGINT collection is 
diminishing.  The Internet is rapidly expanding with more users and data being 
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transmitted.169  In August 2001, just before the September 11 terrorist attacks, 
the Internet had 513 million users, which constituted 8.6% of the world’s 
population.170  In December 2019, the Internet had about 4.574 billion users, 
which constituted 58.7% of the world’s population.171  As Internet growth has 
occurred, more transmission facilities have been built and are being planned, 
such as Internet exchange points that transmit local Asian and European traffic 
and undersea communications cables.172  For example, Brazil and the European 
Union have agreed to lay an undersea cable for communications that would 
connect South America directly to Europe, which would reduce reliance on 
fiber-optic cables that transit the United States. 173   This agreement was 
motivated at least in part by the desire to try to avoid U.S. SIGINT activities that 
were revealed by Edward Snowden.174  It has been estimated that while 80% of 
the world’s telecommunications traffic transited United States-based routers 
prior to 2001, only about 20% of the world’s telecommunications traffic 
transited the United States by 2010.175   Regardless of whether this specific 
estimate is accurate, there is a very real trend that a smaller share of the world’s 
communications are transiting the United States, which reduces the United 
States’ home field advantage and therefore diminishes the fruitfulness of 
SIGINT acquired through the programs under Section 702.176 
This trend may be exacerbated by a push for data localization laws.  Numerous 
countries have considered or enacted data localization rules “that limit the 
storage, movement, and/or processing of data to specific geographies and 
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jurisdictions, or [would] limit the companies that can manage data based upon 
the company’s nation of incorporation or principal situs of operations and 
management.”177  Some authoritarian governments, such as China and Russia, 
have pursued data localization laws as a way to control the information that is 
available to citizens and to monitor their citizens’ online activities.178  China 
famously restricts access to certain websites and Internet services with the 
“Great Firewall,” and limits cross-border data transfers.179  China has enacted 
numerous laws and issued rules to store data regarding credit information, 
personal information, health information, and business information locally; 
require servers used for an array of publishing services such as “app stores, audio 
and video distribution platforms, online literature databases, and online gaming” 
to be located inside China; and try to exclude foreign technology firms from 
offering cloud-computing services in China. 180   Russia has also enacted 
requirements for the personal data of Russian citizens to be stored in databases 
located inside of Russia, and for telecommunications providers and ISPs to store 
the content and metadata of communications for specific periods of time within 
Russia.181 
Recently, democratic countries have also started to push for data localization.  
Although officials in numerous countries have advocated for data localization 
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by claiming that such policies would better protect privacy in the aftermath of 
the Snowden disclosures, the trend towards data localization seems to be 
primarily motivated by the desire “to protect domestic businesses from foreign 
competition, [and] to support domestic intelligence and law enforcement 
ambitions.”182  United States technology companies have dominated the global 
market, and some European business leaders and politicians appear to have taken 
advantage of the Snowden disclosures and public outcry to promote domestic 
businesses and enable domestic technology companies to garner greater market 
share to the detriment of United States companies by portraying United States 
companies as untrustworthy because of their (lawful and compelled) cooperation 
with the NSA.183 
For example, shortly after the initial Snowden disclosures in summer 2013, 
the German Interior Minister, Hans-Peter Friedrich, stated that “whoever fears 
their communication is being intercepted in any way should use services that 
don’t go through American servers.”184  In 2014, German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel suggested that Europe should improve and develop its own Internet 
infrastructure so that Germany could keep its data inside Europe instead of 
having it transit the United States.185  Chancellor Merkel informed the German 
public that she would work with other European leaders to “discuss which 
European providers . . . offer security for our citizens . . . [s]o that you don’t 
have to go across the Atlantic with emails and other things, but can build up 
communications networks also within Europe.”186  The German government 
terminated its contract with Verizon in June 2014 and announced that it would 
end all business with Verizon by 2015, largely as a result of Verizon having been 
implicated in the NSA’s SIGINT collection activities. 187   A German 
telecommunications company, Deutsche Telekom, then received the contract 
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that had been terminated with Verizon by the German government.188  Germany 
also enacted legislation in 2016 to require telecommunications providers to 
retain metadata for specific periods of time and store that metadata in servers 
located in Germany to improve law enforcement effectiveness, but a German 
regulator suspended enforcement of the data retention provisions in June 2017 
just before the new law was to go into effect because of litigation over whether 
the law complies with European Union law.189 
France has considered data localization rules that may actually be driven by 
the country’s national economic interests, too.  France’s former Minister for 
Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises, Innovation and the Digital Economy, 
Fleur Pellerin, declared that it was necessary “to locate datacentres and servers 
in [French] national territory in order to better ensure data security.”190  France 
has sought to promote French data centers and has stated that it is illegal to use 
a non-“sovereign” cloud, which is a foreign cloud provider, for data produced 
by national or local governments to ensure that government data is stored and 
processed inside of France.191 
In addition, Brazil has considered data localization rules as a way to promote 
its own domestic technology sector.  Former Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff 
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had long championed policy initiatives to increase the number of Internet 
exchange points and increase domestic Internet bandwidth, improve 
connectivity (in part by building undersea cables and overland fiber-optic 
cables), encourage Internet content providers to be based in Brazil, and promote 
the use of domestically produced telecommunications equipment.192  Following 
the Snowden disclosures, the Brazilian government announced plans in to 
abandon its Microsoft Outlook email services, which are from a foreign United 
States-based provider, and move to a domestic email service that uses data 
centers inside Brazil.193  Brazil considered requiring Internet companies to store 
copies of Brazilian citizens’ data in data servers inside Brazil as part of Brazil’s 
Marco Civil da Internet legislation to enable “greater access for Brazilian law 
enforcement to data stored abroad or belonging to foreign companies,” but 
ultimately removed this provision prior to the legislation being passed.194  The 
final law did include a provision that “extends the reach of Brazilian law to any 
Internet service in the world with Brazilian users,” which means that “[a] firm 
based in the United States whose services are used by Brazilians could, for 
example, be penalized for adhering to its domestic data-disclosure laws if they 
conflict with Brazil’s.”195  If Brazil aggressively enforces these rules or once 
again pursues data localization legislation, United States technology companies 
may find it too costly to continue offering their services and products in Brazil. 
These data localization rules create barriers to cross-border data flows and 
threaten to reduce the ability of United States technology companies to do 
business overseas.  Governments at times seek to use data localization laws to 
force companies to move data-related jobs to their countries in an effort to help 
the domestic economies.196  Governments also promote these rules to protect 
and promote domestic companies by making it more costly for foreign firms to 
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do business in their countries.197  The push for data localization could diminish 
United States companies’ market share by reducing their competitiveness 
abroad, which would aggravate the trend towards a smaller percentage of the 
world’s communications transiting the United States because of the growth of 
the Internet.  Thus, the United States’ home field advantage will likely recede in 
the future and the advantages in the Intelligence Community’s ability to acquire 
SIGINT through the programs under Section 702 will be diminished. 
D. Companies No Longer Cooperating with the Government 
SIGINT collection under Section 702 is heavily dependent on a small number 
of technology companies that have become less cooperative in the post-Snowden 
environment. 198   Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, technology 
companies voluntarily aided the government’s surveillance programs described 
in Part I prior to the passage of the PAA and FAA.199  However, the relationship 
between the government and technology companies has fractured in recent 
years, most notably as a result of the Snowden disclosures.  Foreign consumers 
were extremely alarmed by the disclosures, which described United States 
technology companies’ (lawful and compelled) cooperation with the NSA.200  
Thus, foreign consumers became distrustful of American products and online 
services because they feared that their communications would become 
accessible to United States law enforcement or intelligence agencies.201  United 
States technology companies lost between $35 and $180 billion in revenue over 
the three-year period following the Snowden disclosures.202  This increased the 
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 202. DANIEL CASTRO, THE INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., HOW MUCH WILL PRISM 
COST THE U.S. CLOUD COMPUTING INDUSTRY? 3 (2013), http://www2.itif.org/2013-cloud-
computing-costs.pdf (calculating that United States technology companies would lose up to $35 
billion between 2013–2016 following Snowden’s unauthorized disclosures about the NSA’s 
intelligence programs) (last visited Mar. 16, 2020); James Staten, The Cost of PRISM Will Be 
Larger Than ITIF Projects, FORRESTER (Aug. 15, 2013, 11:02 AM), 
http://blogs.forrester.com/james_staten/13-08-14-
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companies could lose up to $180 billion between 2013–2016 because of disclosures about NSA 
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incentive for these technology companies to adopt a more publicly adversarial 
relationship with the United States government.203 
There is also a significant ideological and cultural divide between many 
leaders in the technology industry and the government, which adds to the friction 
and desire on the part of technology companies to resist government 
surveillance.  Professor Amy Zegart has described the “yawning cultural divide 
between policymakers in Washington and engineers in Silicon Valley tech 
companies” as the “suit-hoodie divide.”204  Many technology leaders have more 
libertarian political beliefs than those in government and some are even 
ideologically inclined to thwart surveillance efforts.205  These major technology 
companies are also multinational corporations with significant global customer 
bases, and thus often view themselves as global enterprises that are not 
necessarily predisposed to serve the United States government’s interests. 
Technology companies have the ability to innovate in a manner that can 
frustrate government SIGINT collection efforts. 206   Service providers are 
increasingly offering encryption by default, especially end-to-end encryption.207  
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(discussing Moxie Marlinspike’s, a security researcher who developed Signal and helped encrypt 
WhatsApp, advocacy of encryption and Marlinspike’s belief that people should be able to use 
encryption to break the law because this may inspire social change in some areas); Cade Metz, 
Forget Apple vs. the FBI: WhatsApp Just Switched on Encryption for a Billion People, WIRED 
(Apr. 5, 2016, 11:08 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/04/forget-apple-vs-fbi-whatsapp-just-
switched-encryption-billion-people/ (observing that it is “an article of faith that’s commonly held 
among Silicon Valley engineers” that “online privacy must be protected against surveillance of 
all kinds” and that “[i]n Silicon Valley, strong encryption isn’t really up for debate [since] [a]mong 
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These products encrypt data and communications in such a way that the service 
provider does not have the technical ability to decrypt the information.208  End-
to-end encryption improves the security of these products against malicious 
actors and allows companies to signal that they value customer privacy. 209  
Providers that offer unbreakable end-to-end encryption cannot respond to lawful 
orders under Section 702 with useful information because they do not possess 
the decrypted information that the government is requesting. 210   In 2016, 
WhatsApp, an online messaging service on smartphones that is now owned by 
Facebook, implemented end-to-end encryption to its service, which is used by 
more than two billion people.211 
Some have questioned whether end-to-end encryption will be widely adopted 
by the technology industry because it conflicts with many companies’ business 
models.212  Many technology companies rely on advertising revenue to subsidize 
free content and services, and advertising is very dependent on user data to 
produce targeted advertisements. 213   End-to-end encryption would reduce 
companies’ access to useful user information, which means that companies 
could risk losing revenue if they employed end-to-end encryption.214  Access to 
consumer data can also enhance a product or service’s security because this can 
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Millions of Users, WIRED (Nov. 18, 2014, 10:54 AM), https://www.wired.com/2014/11/whatsapp-
encrypted-messaging/; Metz, supra note 205; Two Billion Users—Connecting the World Privately, 
WHATSAPP (Feb. 12, 2020), https://blog.whatsapp.com/two-billion-users-connecting-the-world-
privately. 
 212. MATTHEW G. OLSEN ET AL., BERKMAN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y, DON’T PANIC: 
MAKING PROGRESS ON THE “GOING DARK” DEBATE 10–12 (2016) https://dash.harvard.edu/ 
bitstream/handle/1/28552576/Dont_Panic_Making_Progress_on_Going_Dark_Debate.pdf?seque
nce=1&isAllowed=y. 
 213. Id. at 10–11. 
 214. Id. 
92 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 69:53 
allow the company to scan for malware, which would not be possible with end-
to-end encryption.215 
However, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) insists 
that end-to-end encryption poses a significant problem.216  ODNI believes that 
there is already a trend developing of companies implementing end-to-end 
encryption and United States adversaries using these tools to avoid 
surveillance.217  Also, in the aftermath of the NSA announcing the voluntary 
termination of “about” collection, Julian Sanchez, a senior fellow at the Cato 
Institute, and Nicholas Weaver, a senior researcher at the International Computer 
Science Institute and professor in computer science at the University of 
California Berkley, speculated that the increasing prevalence of encryption of 
email traffic between servers made it more difficult to scan the contents of email 
during transit and therefore made “about” collection less useful to the NSA.218  
Nicholas Weaver has even stated that “upstream is dying . . . because everything 
is getting encrypted.”219 
Further, multinational technology companies have global infrastructure and 
are building data centers around the world, which enables them to store data 
overseas.220  Companies have legitimate business reasons to store data overseas 
because some foreign customers may prefer having their data be physically 
located in their own countries and storing a user’s data near the physical location 
of that user may enhance the quality of service.221  Storing data overseas may 
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make it more difficult for the government to access the data because Section 702 
may not empower the government to compel data that is stored overseas.222  
Companies that see a business advantage in opposing government SIGINT 
collection efforts or have an ideological reason for doing so may be driven to 
intentionally configure their data storage architecture to have data be stored 
outside the United States such that the government cannot obtain such 
information under Section 702.  Although the NSA would not have the same 
difficulties that law enforcement has had in obtaining data stored overseas 
because the NSA could utilize Executive Order 12333 collection to obtain such 
information, as discussed supra in Part I.C, Section 702 offers unique 
advantages that Executive Order 12333 lacks so this shift could potentially 
diminish the quality of intelligence that the NSA could collect.223 
The government is now extremely dependent on technology companies to 
facilitate SIGINT collection under Section 702, which means that these private 
firms wield tremendous power.224  As Professor Alan Rozenshtein has observed, 
this is a stark example of “private actors wielding public power: when, by virtue 
of their opposition to a core government activity, they challenge traditional 
conceptions of state sovereignty and thereby transform into ‘supercitizens.’”225  
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The relationship between the government and technology companies has 
become more adversarial in the aftermath of Snowden’s unauthorized 
disclosures.  Technology companies have sought to regain consumers’ 
confidence, especially foreign consumers, by innovating technologically in a 
manner that reduces their capability to respond to lawful orders. 226   The 
widespread adoption of encryption technologies and possible shift to storing data 
overseas to avoid complying with lawful surveillance orders may severely 
diminish the Intelligence Community’s ability to conduct fruitful SIGINT under 
Section 702. 
III.  STRATEGIES TO ADDRESS THE DIFFICULTIES IN ACCURATELY 
DETERMINING LOCATION 
The United States’ current legal regime governing SIGINT activities is 
predicated on the location of the target.  If location becomes significantly more 
difficult to determine because of the increased prevalence and advancement of 
location-spoofing and anonymity technologies, the United States may have to 
reconsider how location should factor into this legal paradigm. 
A. Fourth Amendment Doctrine and the Difficulty in Determining Location 
The Fourth Amendment is territorial in nature and a person’s connections to 
the United States dictate whether the individual is protected under the Fourth 
Amendment.  Social contract theory pervaded American political philosophy 
prior to the Constitution, and the United States Constitution was drafted as a 
social contract between the American people and the United States 
government.227  The social compact stressed that a government’s legitimacy 
stems from the consent of the governed.228  Formerly free individuals willingly 
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united to establish communities by undertaking obligations to the government 
in exchange for the protection of certain rights.229 
The Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to the 
searches of foreigners outside of the United States in Verdugo-Urquidez.230  
Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez, a citizen and resident of Mexico, was a leader 
of a violent drug cartel in Mexico and was involved in the kidnapping, torture, 
and murder of a United States Drug Enforce Administration (DEA) Special 
Agent.231  Verdugo-Urquidez was apprehended in Mexico and transported to the 
United States border where he was transferred to United States custody.232  DEA 
Agents, working with Mexican police, then searched Verdugo-Urquidez’s 
properties in Mexico and seized documents to use as evidence.233  The Supreme 
Court determined that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to the search and 
seizure by United States agents of property owned by a nonresident alien and 
located in a foreign country.234  The Court reasoned that the phrase “the people” 
in the Fourth Amendment “refers to a class of persons who are part of a national 
community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this 
country to be considered part of that community.”235  Therefore, the Fourth 
Amendment likely protects individuals who are lawfully present in the United 
States because these individuals are either part of the United States’ national 
community or likely have sufficient connections to the United States by virtue 
of their lawful presence in the country.236  This means that location must be part 
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of the legal regime governing SIGINT activities under current Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, but this may raise serious difficulties as a person’s 
true location may become increasingly more difficult to ascertain.  This raises 
the question of how the law should adapt to the uncertainty of location. 
Some have argued that technological advancements have made the world 
much more interconnected and that national borders have become less 
significant so the Fourth Amendment’s protections should apply to all 
individuals—regardless of location or non-United States person status.  
Professor Jennifer Daskal has proposed a “presumptive” Fourth Amendment in 
which the Fourth Amendment is presumed to apply “regardless of whether the 
collection takes place inside or outside the United States, and regardless of 
whether the target is a U.S. person or not” unless “the government establishes 
that none of the parties to the communication is a U.S. person.”237  A more 
security-oriented approach may be that in a world in which location becomes 
extremely difficult to determine accurately, the FISA legal regime governing 
SIGINT activities should create a new category for non-United States persons 
appearing to be located in the United States.  These individuals, who the 
Intelligence Community could not develop a reasonable belief that they were 
outside the United States, but still reasonably believed were non-United States 
persons, could still be targeted if the Intelligence Community has reasonable 
suspicion that these individuals are likely to possess, receive, and/or 
communicate foreign intelligence information rather than forcing the NSA or 
FBI to establish probable cause that these individuals are agents of a foreign 
power as long as the Intelligence Community has not conclusively determined 
that these individuals are physically located inside the United States.  The FISC 
would be required to make this reasonable suspicion determination on an 
individualized basis.  Further, if the Intelligence Community gained conclusive 
evidence that the target was actually physically located inside the United States, 
then the Intelligence Community would have one week to shift collection to 
FISA Title I.  Finally, another security-oriented approach would be that if 
technology develops and is widely adopted such that determining location 
becomes an extreme problem for the NSA and SIGINT collection under Section 
702 is severely hindered, it could be necessary to amend FISA by creating two 
categories: one for United States persons and one for non-United States persons.  
These more security-oriented approaches would each rely heavily on the foreign 
intelligence exception to the warrant clause in the Fourth Amendment. 
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1.  Extend Fourth Amendment Protections in a Universal Manner 
Extending Fourth Amendment protections in a universal manner would 
reduce the difficulty presented by not being able to determine accurately a 
target’s location because this factor would no longer matter as even non-United 
States persons overseas would receive Fourth Amendment protections.238  This 
embrace of universal privacy rights would be a major break with the United 
States’ social compact tradition and would be an explicit rejection of the holding 
in Verdugo-Urquidez.239  The approach would also mean that the United States 
would be accepting the enormous security costs that would come from such a 
decision.  The United States could not maintain nearly the same level of 
intelligence capabilities as the Intelligence Community currently has if the 
United States adopted the universalist approach.  This would inevitably mean 
that the Intelligence Community would lose visibility into malicious actors and 
threats because the United States—as with all countries—has fewer resources to 
identify threats from foreigners abroad compared with its ability to identify 
threats from citizens inside the country.240  Ultimately, pursuing this path would 
greatly diminish the United States’ capacity to gain intelligence to protect the 
United States’ national security interests, the American people, and the 
Homeland. 
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2.  A Presumptive Fourth Amendment 
Professor Daskal rejects the universalist approach, but still argues for more 
expansive privacy protections under a presumptive Fourth Amendment 
approach.241  Professor Daskal argues that the rules that govern data collection 
activities “should presumptively apply to U.S. persons and non-U.S. persons 
alike, regardless of whether the target of the acquisition or the data being 
acquired is based in the United States—absent a determination that all parties to 
the communication are non-U.S. persons.”242  This position is based on the 
desire to protect United States persons’ communications that may be implicated 
in collection activities, especially through incidental collection.243 
In practice, this proposal would mean that Fourth Amendment protections 
would be extended to most foreign intelligence surveillance targets as it would 
be extremely difficult to show that no one in a communication was a United 
States person or located inside the United States, especially if location becomes 
difficult to ascertain in the future.  The approach is certainly contrary to current 
practice and would extend Fourth Amendment protections to many foreigners 
abroad who are not part of the United States’ social compact and have therefore 
not been granted the same privacy protections under law as United States 
persons.244 
Professor Daskal’s vast extension of Fourth Amendment protections to non-
United States persons overseas would hinder the Intelligence Community’s 
ability to gather intelligence and create a culture of diminished aggressiveness, 
which could result in troubling security harms—especially at a time when the 
United States faces an exceptionally complex threat environment.  The NSA 
already employs minimization procedures that dictate how the agency limits the 
accessibility, retention, and dissemination of “nonpublicly available information 
concerning unconsenting United States persons” who are not the target of the 
surveillance. 245   These minimization procedures help protect United States 
persons’ privacy interests and diminish the intrusiveness of incidental or 
inadvertent collection. 
                                                     
 241. Daskal, supra note 5, at 383–87. 
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3.  Amend FISA to Create a New Category for Non-United States Persons 
Appearing to be Located Inside the United States 
If location becomes burdensome and extremely difficult to determine 
accurately for the NSA, a more security-oriented reform would be to reform the 
FISA legal regime governing surveillance to create a new category for non-
United States persons that the NSA is not able to establish a reasonable belief 
that they are outside of the United States, but still has a reasonable suspicion that 
such persons are likely to possess, receive, and/or communicate foreign 
intelligence information.  Under this reform, there would be three primary FISA 
categories: (1) United States persons and individuals conclusively determined to 
be physically located inside the United States, (2) non-United States persons 
appearing to be located inside the United States, and (3) non-United States 
persons reasonably believed to be outside the United States. 
FISA has various provisions that distinguish between United States persons 
that are inside the United States and United States persons that are reasonably 
believed to be outside the United States, but all of these provisions require 
probable cause findings that the United States person is “a foreign power or an 
agent of a foreign power”246 (in the case of United States persons inside the 
United States) or “a foreign power, an agent of a foreign power, or an officer or 
employee of a foreign power”247 (in the case of United States persons that are 
reasonably believed to be outside the United States). 248   There are subtle 
differences in the way FISA treats these subcategories of United States persons, 
but for the purposes of this Article I group these sub-categories of United States 
persons together as one category because FISA requires that the FISC make an 
individualized probable cause finding prior to the Intelligence Community 
targeting any United States persons—regardless of whether they are inside or 
outside the United States—under the statute.249  This reform would continue to 
require a probable cause finding prior to targeting any United States person or 
person conclusively determined to be inside the United States under FISA. 
The second category—non-United States persons appearing to be located 
inside the United States—would currently not be covered by Section 702 and 
the government would likely need to obtain a FISC order based on a probable 
cause finding that the person is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power to 
target such individuals.  Under this reform, the government would only need to 
establish reasonable suspicion that a person in this new category is likely to 
possess, receive, and/or communicate foreign intelligence information despite 
the fact that the person appears to be located inside the United States.  This 
reform would include the privacy protective measure of requiring that the FISC 
make an individualized reasonable suspicion determination prior to the 
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Intelligence Community targeting individuals in this category.  Further, this 
reform would require that if the Intelligence Community gained conclusive 
evidence that the target is actually physically located inside the United States 
then the Intelligence Community would have one week to shift collection to 
FISA Title I. 
The final category of non-United States persons reasonably believed to be 
outside the United States would remain the same as currently exists under 
Section 702. 
In a world in which advanced anonymity and location-spoofing technologies 
are more prevalent, and cause problems for the NSA in making pre-tasking 
foreignness determinations and in conducting post-tasking analysis regarding an 
individual’s location, this reform can alleviate some of the difficulties.  The 
government would be able to target non-United States persons that successfully 
use these technologies to hide their true locations and appear to be located inside 
the United States as long as the government can meet the less stringent legal 
standard of reasonable suspicion instead of requiring the government to establish 
probable cause that the target is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power 
under FISA Title I. 250   The government would also have an easier time 
maintaining SIGINT collection against individuals that were originally targeted 
as non-United States persons reasonably believed to be overseas, but during 
post-tasking analysis appear to have entered the United States.  The government 
could transition its collection efforts against such individuals from the non-
United States persons reasonably believed to be outside the United States 
category to the non-United States persons appearing to be located inside the 
United States category as long as the government maintained a reasonable 
suspicion that the target is likely to possess, receive, and/or communicate foreign 
intelligence information.  This could help reduce the post-tasking analysis 
resource problem that could be created by these technologies and diminish the 
number of targets that the government would have to cease collecting on when 
it appeared that the individual had entered the United States.  The reasonable 
suspicion standard in this reform is a less demanding legal hurdle than the 
probable cause determination in FISA Title I, which should reduce the potential 
for situations in which the government was able to collect on a target under 
Section 702, but did not have enough information to target the person under 
FISA Title I.  Also, it would not require as much time to establish reasonable 
suspicion as is currently needed for FISA Title I applications.251  The reasonable 
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suspicion determination would be made by the FISC on an individualized basis 
because of the privacy concerns that are implicated by the fact that some of these 
targets that are non-United States persons appearing to be located inside the 
United States will indeed actually be located inside the United States and not 
just using technologies to try to thwart NSA SIGINT collection that make this 
appear to be the case. 
This reform would also require that if the Intelligence Community gained 
conclusive evidence that the target is actually physically located inside the 
United States then the Intelligence Community would have one week to shift 
collection to FISA Title I.  There will certainly be some instances in which the 
non-United States person appearing to be located inside the United States target 
will indeed truly be located inside the United States and intelligence will reveal 
this information.  For example, an FBI agent may positively identify a non-
United States person foreign intelligence target inside the United States while 
conducting physical surveillance or biometrics may establish that a non-United 
States person foreign intelligence target has entered the United States.  These 
examples would both meet the conclusive evidence standard under this reform 
to require that the Intelligence Community shift collection to FISA Title I.  The 
information required to meet this conclusive evidence standard does not need to 
be as concrete as these examples, but solely having email content that says that 
a target is inside the United States would not be sufficient enough under this 
reform to require the Intelligence Community to shift collection to FISA Title I 
because this information could be manipulated as part of tradecraft to 
complement the use of anonymity or location-spoofing technologies.  Analysts 
would be required to assess whether a non-United States person appearing to be 
located inside the United States target can actually be conclusively determined 
to be physically located inside the United States whenever new information 
regarding location is acquired, and analysts would be required to document their 
assessments.  These assessments would be periodically reviewed to ensure that 
the Intelligence Community is adhering to the reformed legal regime. 
This reform relies heavily on the foreign intelligence exception to the warrant 
requirement.  Non-United States persons appearing to be located inside the 
United States are likely entitled to Fourth Amendment protections because these 
individuals likely have sufficient connections (or appear to have sufficient 
connections in regard to individuals that only appear to be located inside the 
United States by virtue of their use of anonymity or location-spoofing 
technologies) to the United States by virtue of their lawful presence in the 
country.252  The government’s action in regard to this new category must comply 
with the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement to be 
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constitutional.253  The government has an extremely strong interest in collecting 
foreign intelligence information and the Supreme Court has noted that “[i]t is 
‘obvious and unarguable’ that no governmental interest is more compelling than 
the security of the Nation.”254  This new legal regime would only be created as 
a result of significant problems for the government in accurately determining 
location because of the advances and prevalence of anonymity and location-
spoofing technologies, which means that the government’s ability to conduct 
speedy SIGINT collection for foreign intelligence purposes would potentially be 
diminished without the reform.  This adds to the gravity of the threat the reform 
is intended to address. 255   Further, this new legal regime would have the 
protection of requiring prior judicial review, as a FISC judge would be required 
to make the determination that there is reasonable suspicion that the target is 
likely to possess, receive, and/or communicate foreign intelligence information.  
The legal regime would also continue to have the protections of requiring that 
targeting procedures, minimization procedures, and certifications be approved 
by the FISC.  In addition, this reform would have the significant protection of 
requiring the Intelligence Community to shift collection to FISA Title I if it 
gained conclusive evidence that the target is actually physically located inside 
the United States.  The government’s interest and the protections granted to the 
targeted persons’ privacy rights must be weighed against the privacy intrusion that 
occurs.256  Surveillance constitutes a significant intrusion into the privacy rights 
of the individual who is targeted.  SIGINT collection can reveal intimate 
information about an individual, such as one’s political association, religious 
belief, and sexual habits.257  Despite this intrusion, “the ultimate touchstone of the 
Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness’” and the protections put in place under this 
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regime should be deemed reasonable in view of the significant government interest 
at stake to uphold the government’s action as reasonable.258 
The primary concerns with this reform are that SIGINT collection targeting 
non-United States persons appearing to be located inside the United States will 
implicate more United States persons in incidental collection than currently 
occurs under Section 702 and that collecting on targets appearing to be located 
inside the United States based solely on reasonably suspicion, not probable 
cause, increases the potential for domestic political abuse.  While this reform 
would be intended to address the difficulties in accurately determining location 
because of technological advancements that hinder the Intelligence 
Community’s ability to determine accurately and quickly that a target that 
appears to be inside the United States is actually just using technological tools 
to make it appear that way and is not truly inside the United States, the new 
category of non-United States persons appearing to be located inside the United 
States would inevitably encompass people who actually are present in the United 
States, such as foreign diplomats.  That is why this reform would require the 
Intelligence Community to shift collection to FISA Title I if it gained conclusive 
evidence that the target is actually physically located inside the United States.  
People who are actually present in the United States are much more likely to be 
in contact with Americans, which means that there will be a significant 
likelihood that SIGINT collection targeting these individuals will result in quite 
a lot of incidental collection on Americans.  This raises the potential for domestic 
political abuse, which was a core concern that led to the original FISA statute 
being passed in 1978.  The passage of the original FISA in 1978 expressed “a 
deep concern about potential government abuse within our own political 
system.” 259   FISA prohibits reverse targeting, too, which is a significant 
protection against the government taking advantage of a lesser legal hurdle to 
collect on a non-United States person as a pretext for the actual purpose of 
acquiring information about United States persons that have not separately been 
deemed appropriate targets by the FISC.260  These protections help to ensure that 
the original FISA’s intent to provide “special protections for United States 
persons . . . as a crucial safeguard of democratic accountability and effective 
self-governance within the American political system” would continue to exist 
under this reform.261 
Further, this reform could take advantage of minimization at the point of 
collection to enhance privacy protections for the United States persons who 
communicate with the non-United States person appearing to be located inside 
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the United States target.  Data acquired under this new category could also be 
tagged and treated as a special category of information that has a relatively short 
retention period.  There is obviously increased risk by imposing enhanced 
minimization requirements and subjecting this data to shorter retention periods 
because information that might become important later on would have been 
deleted, which creates the potential that an important relationship connection or 
illicit activity could be missed.  Nonetheless, the privacy concerns regarding the 
increased incidental collection of United States person communications may be 
significant enough to warrant these measures.  These back-end privacy 
protections enhance the reasonableness of this reform proposal under the Fourth 
Amendment, too. 
4.  Amend FISA to Distinguish Based Only on United States Person vs. Non-
United States Person Status 
Another security-oriented reform would be to remove location as a statutory 
factor in determining what legal standard should apply, and solely distinguish 
based on whether a target is a United States person or non-United States person.  
This reform would go even further than the proposal discussed in Part III.A.3, 
but could be necessary if technology develops to the point that location can no 
longer be accurately determined for a significant number of targets to the extent 
that collection efforts under Section 702 are severely hindered.  Under this 
approach, SIGINT collection targeting United States persons would continue to 
have to be based on a probable cause finding by a FISC judge that the person is 
a foreign power or agent of a foreign power.  SIGINT collection targeting non-
United States persons would only be based on a finding made by government 
officials that there is reasonable suspicion that the person is likely to possess, 
receive, and/or communicate foreign intelligence information.  Intelligence 
Community officials would make this determination based on targeting 
procedures, minimization procedures, and certifications that are approved by the 
FISC such that this category would function the way Section 702 currently 
operates, and not require individualized findings of reasonable suspicion by the 
FISC.  Section 702 currently has more than 164,000 targets,262 so it would likely 
not be practically possible to require the FISC to make a reasonable suspicion 
determination on each one of these targets plus the other non-United States 
person targets that would now be included in this reformed category that were 
previously not targeted under Section 702. 
This would simplify the government’s efforts because the Intelligence 
Community would no longer have to make a determination regarding a target’s 
location under the statute.  The Intelligence Community would only have to 
make determinations regarding the target’s status as a United States person or 
non-United States person and the foreign intelligence purpose.  In practice, a 
target’s location has significant intelligence value so analysts will likely still try 
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to determine this piece of information, but this determination would not have 
legal significance because of the extreme technical challenges in accurately 
obtaining this information.  The government would be able to target non-United 
States persons that successfully use these technologies to hide their true 
locations and appear to be located inside the United States as long as the 
government can meet the less stringent legal standard of reasonable suspicion 
instead of requiring the government to establish probable cause that the target is 
a foreign power or agent of a foreign power under FISA Title I.263  Also, the 
Intelligence Community would not face problems in conducting post-tasking 
analysis because it would not be legally significant if the target appeared to have 
entered the United States during post-tasking analysis as long as the government 
still had the reasonable belief that the person was a non-United States person and 
reasonable suspicion that the person is likely to possess, receive, and/or 
communicate foreign intelligence information. 
This reform proposal places a significant amount of weight on the foreign 
intelligence exception.  Some of the individuals in the non-United States persons 
category will surely be present inside the United States and therefore likely have 
Fourth Amendment rights by virtue of likely having sufficient connections to 
the United States.264   The government’s action would therefore need to be 
reasonable to be constitutional under the Fourth Amendment.  As discussed 
supra, the government’s interest in collecting foreign intelligence information 
to protect national security is a compelling interest of the upmost importance.265  
This new legal regime would only be created if location was no longer a 
practically useful factor to consider because of the evolutions in technology, 
which would transform the location factor in the current FISA legal regime into 
a significant and dangerous hindrance.  This means that the reform proposal 
would only be enacted if maintaining the status quo posed a significant threat. 
Unlike the proposal in Part III.A.3, this proposal would not have the added 
protection of requiring individualized judicial review prior to SIGINT collection 
against non-United States person targets because prior individualized judicial 
review would not be possible given the scale of collection efforts against more 
than 164,000 non-United States person targets.  This legal regime would 
continue to have the protection of requiring that targeting procedures, 
minimization procedures, and certifications be approved by the FISC as with the 
current Section 702 design.  The government’s interest and the protections 
granted to the targeted persons’ privacy rights must be weighed against the 
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privacy intrusion that occurs.266  Surveillance constitutes a significant intrusion 
into the privacy rights of the individual who is targeted.  SIGINT collection can 
reveal intimate information about an individual.267  The reasonableness of the 
government’s activities under this reform proposal is less certain because of the 
lack of individualized prior judicial review, even for those non-United States 
persons that are located inside the United States and therefore have Fourth 
Amendment rights.  The significance of the government’s interests and 
protections provided by the targeting procedures, minimization procedures, and 
certifications may be sufficient to make the government’s action reasonable.  
Further, the technological developments that would necessitate this type of 
reform could force significant Fourth Amendment doctrinal developments, 
which may place this reform proposal on stronger constitutional footing. 
This reform proposal presents the same concerns as discussed in Part III.A.3 
because solely distinguishing based on United States person and non-United 
States person status will lead to SIGINT collection targeting non-United States 
persons located inside the United States.  This implicates more United States 
persons in incidental collection than currently occurs under Section 702 and 
collecting on targets inside the United States based solely on reasonably 
suspicion, not probable cause, increases the potential for domestic political 
abuse.  Reverse targeting would still be prohibited, which is a significant 
protection.  However, there is less of an upside in creating strict minimization 
procedures with relatively short retention periods for information collected on 
non-United States persons under this reform because the vast majority of 
individuals in this category would be non-United States persons overseas, and 
therefore would not have Fourth Amendment rights.  The security costs that can 
result by deleting information that may be useful at a later point in time would 
also be greater under this reform than the reform in Part III.A.3 because the 
category of all non-United States person targets is much larger than the category 
of non-United States persons located inside the United States.  Nonetheless, it 
may be necessary to have strict minimizations procedures despite the security 
costs to increase the reasonableness of the reform proposal under the Fourth 
Amendment.  This proposal goes much further than the reform proposal in Part 
III.A.3 and would likely only be desirable under the most extreme 
circumstances. 
B. Reforming Procedures to be More Forward Leaning 
It may be prudent to create more forward leaning procedures to ease some of 
the difficulties that could be caused by increased uncertainty of the location of 
targets.  One approach would be to build “lists of IP addresses [that are] 
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associated with known VPN providers.”268  This would ensure that when a target 
uses one of the United States-based VPNs that the NSA is aware of, the analysts 
can immediately learn that the target is using a location-spoofing device and has 
not actually entered the United States—or at least know that this piece of 
information does not indicate that the target has entered the United States.  
Creating lists of IP addresses that are associated with known VPN providers 
would also enhance privacy protections for United States persons because 
United States persons located inside the United States may use VPN providers 
that are based overseas, and therefore the United States person’s IP address 
would indicate that they were abroad.  If the NSA had knowledge that the 
specific IP address was associated with a VPN, this piece of information would 
be given no weight in the foreignness determination that is based on the totality 
of the circumstances, which would diminish the potential for inadvertent 
collection on a United States person.  The NSA could bring the “lists of IP 
addresses [that are] associated with known VPN providers” to the FISC’s 
attention to ensure that the FISC is aware that the NSA is taking such measures 
to deal with the problem of determining location when targets use location-
spoofing technologies.269 
If procedures allow for greater collection of communications on the front-end, 
the Intelligence Community can develop greater back-end privacy protections to 
ensure that collection efforts remain reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  
The Intelligence Community can tag the data collected from targets that appear 
to have entered the United States and have shorter retention periods and stricter 
dissemination limits on this data if the Intelligence Community is authorized to 
continue collecting on these targets, either because one of the reforms proposed 
above in Parts III.A.3 or III.A.4 were adopted or because the NSA gained 
approval to ignore indicators from the IP addresses that are associated with 
known United States-based VPN providers.  Although these SIGINT programs 
and databases are already extremely complex and adding in more complexity 
increases the potential for compliance issues, data tagging seems to be an 
increasingly useful tool in helping the Intelligence Community place special 
rules on certain data.270 
Finally, the Intelligence Community should be proactive in explaining the 
technological challenges that it faces to the FISC.271  This will help to better 
inform FISC judges of impending problems and avoid situations in which in 
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which technological challenges become compliance problems.272  It is in the 
NSA’s interest to avoid situations in which it has to report compliance problems 
to the FISC after they have occurred to try to explain why it has not been able to 
implement the collection as originally presented to the FISC in the application, 
and as approved in the court order.273  Ideally, a more proactive approach would 
create a more collaborative environment where the NSA, Department of Justice 
(DOJ), and FISC develop rules and procedures that allow for flexibility to adjust 
to new technical challenges while providing adequate privacy protections.274 
IV. WHAT’S PAST IS PROLOGUE: THE NECESSITY TO RELY HEAVILY ON 
EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333 TO DEAL WITH A DIMINISHED HOME FIELD 
ADVANTAGE AND REDUCED COMPLIANCE BY TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES 
As the Internet continues to grow, more transmission facilities will be built 
around the world, which will diminish communications networks’ reliance on 
United States-based physical infrastructure. 275   This means that a smaller 
percentage of the world’s communications will transit the United States.  The 
reduction in the United States’ home field advantage will diminish the 
usefulness of Section 702 in the future.276  The push towards data localization 
could diminish United States companies’ market share and could exacerbate the 
trend towards a smaller percentage of the world’s communications transiting the 
United States. 277   Further, United States-based multi-national technology 
companies have innovated technologically, especially in the aftermath of the 
Snowden disclosures, in a manner that reduces their ability to respond to lawful 
surveillance orders and makes intelligence collection more difficult.  The 
widespread adoption of encryption has created difficulties for the Intelligence 
Community—and will likely create significant problems in the future—and the 
possible shift to storing data overseas to avoid complying with lawful orders 
may also reduce the usefulness of Section 702.278  As Section 702 becomes less 
useful in the future, the Intelligence Community must assess how it can improve 
collection under Executive Order 12333 to ensure that the government continues 
to acquire vital intelligence to protect United States national security interests.279 
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There are a number of areas that the Intelligence Community should focus on 
to enhance Executive Order 12333 SIGINT collection.  The Intelligence 
Community should continue to invest significant resources in decrypting 
communications, especially in technologies that can assist in being able to 
decrypt communications at scale; continue to conduct outreach to technology 
companies whose cooperation will always be helpful in SIGINT collection 
because these private companies own the communications systems; and increase 
the focus on obtaining cooperation from foreign entities and compromising key 
strategic targets.  Further, beyond enhancing SIGINT collection capabilities, the 
Intelligence Community must concentrate on how to develop and improve 
technological tools that can assist in conducting intelligence analysis at scale to 
be able to sift through and make sense of the massive quantities of data that are 
collected. 
A. Obtain Decrypted Communications and Invest in Decrypting 
Communications 
The increased prevalence of encryption creates a serious impediment to the 
Intelligence Community being able to obtain useful information.  Although the 
NSA may have the technical and cryptographic skills to be able to decrypt a lot 
of data, the widespread adoption of encryption technologies still poses a 
significant problem because the NSA may not be able to decrypt the information 
at the scale that is needed.  One approach to alleviating the difficulties that 
encryption poses for Section 702 would be for Congress to enact a lawful access 
requirement.280  Encryption would still pose a problem for SIGINT collection 
that occurs under Executive Order 12333, which will become more important as 
the United States’ home field advantage diminishes, regardless of whether 
Congress enacts a lawful access requirement because technology companies 
outside of the United States are also adopting encryption technologies.281  The 
NSA must therefore continue to invest resources in being able to decrypt 
communications and acquiring unencrypted communications. 
There is a currently a robust debate over whether there should be a lawful 
access requirement to mandate that companies maintain access to users’ 
communications and data, and provide law enforcement or intelligence agencies 
with access upon receipt of a lawful order.282  If Congress enacted a lawful 
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access requirement, the NSA would be able to acquire targets’ plaintext 
communications from technology companies upon issuing a directive under 
Section 702 because the companies would be required to maintain access to their 
users’ communications.  This would alleviate the difficulties that encryption 
poses to Section 702 collection. 
However, the private sector and some cryptographers fear that the 
technological architecture that would guarantee law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies access would compromise user security and privacy.283  
Building in lawful access would increase systems’ complexities, which would 
increase vulnerabilities because the new feature could interact with existing 
features in unintended and unknown ways.284  Also, the encryption keys that 
would need to be retained by the companies, government, or third party would 
become targets for illicit actors to attack.285  Thus, user security could be put at 
greater risk with a lawful access requirement.  This could result in increased theft 
of intellectual property through cybercrime, which already costs United States 
companies about $250 billion per year.286 
Also, surveillance by governments that have less robust legal processes as the 
United States would be made easier by the new technological architecture 
because United States products are used around the world.287  A lawful access 
requirement may conflict with the United States’ foreign policy interests at times 
when unbreakable encryption could be favored because dissidents could use it 
to challenge authoritarian regimes.288  Further, sophisticated illicit actors would 
be able to encrypt their communications regardless of whether the United States 
mandated lawful access because they could switch to foreign technology 
services and products that would continue to offer unbreakable encryption 
because they would not be affected by the United States’ lawful access 
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requirement. 289   Finally, requiring lawful access could further diminish the 
market share and economic viability of United States companies because this 
requirement could reinforce foreign consumers’ beliefs that using American 
products or online services would make their communications accessible to 
United States law enforcement or intelligence agencies.290  This could contribute 
even more to the erosion of the United States’ home field advantage and 
diminish the United States’ economic strength, which is an important aspect of 
the United States’ role in the world.291 
Some of the concerns that caution against a lawful access requirement may 
not be as severe as some have argued.  Several major Internet companies 
currently have the ability to decrypt information and have not suffered major 
security problems, which indicates that these companies’ services may not be 
made insecure by having the ability to decrypt information.  For example, 
Google has the ability to decrypt Gmail and Gchat communications because this 
allows Google to target users for advertisements.292  Also, Gmail is able to filter 
spam, which can contain malware, because Google can read emails’ plaintext, 
which would not be possible with end-to-end encryption.293  Google offers the 
full text search of files stored in the cloud, which requires access to plaintext, 
too, and could not occur with end-to-end encryption.294  There have not been 
security issues with Google’s services thus far.295 
Further, consumers may care more about being able to be connected to friends, 
having easy to use and reliable products, and having sleek interfaces and useful 
applications, and may be willing to sacrifice some privacy and security in 
exchange.  A recent study surveying 1,510 participants, including both 
information technology security experts and non-experts, from the United 
States, United Kingdom, and Germany found that privacy and security only play 
a minor role in people’s decisions to use a particular mobile instant 
messenger.296  The primary reason that participants gave for using a mobile 
instant messenger “was whether friends were using the messenger.”297  Of those 
surveyed, 46.1% of participants from the United States, 48.2% of participants 
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from the United Kingdom, and 54.9% of participants from Germany stated this 
was the main reason they used a particular mobile instant messenger.298  On the 
other hand, only a small percentage of participants stated the main reason they 
used a mobile instant messenger was because of privacy and security.299  Only 
5.6% of participants from the United States, 3.4% of participants from the 
United Kingdom, and 13.1% of participants from Germany stated this was the 
main reason that they used a particular mobile instant messenger. 300   If 
consumers are not driven to select products and services based on whether they 
offer unbreakable encryption, then perhaps the fear that United States companies 
will lose market share and that the economic viability of United States 
companies would be hurt by a lawful access requirement is overstated.  A full 
discussion of the arguments in the “going dark” debate, which is a complex 
issue, is beyond the scope of this Article.  I have previously advocated for a 
lawful access requirement and believe that pursuing this policy would help to 
maintain the usefulness of SIGINT collection under Section 702.301 
Regardless of whether Congress enacts a lawful access requirement, it is 
important for the Intelligence Community to develop strategies to address 
widespread encryption.  Acquiring communications is most useful if the 
Intelligence Community can decrypt the information or get the information in 
plaintext form.  Continuing to invest in technologies that can aid in decryption 
is extremely important, especially technologies that can assist in the decryption 
of large quantities of information.  Quantum computing may be an enormous 
breakthrough in being able to decrypt information at scale.  The Intelligence 
Community may need to devote more resources towards compromising major 
foreign ISPs, discussed more infra, 302  to collect traffic as it transits the 
companies’ infrastructure.  If the company has access to plaintext 
communications for its own business reasons, then compromising that company 
will allow the Intelligence Community to collect unencrypted communications.  
Nonetheless, the Intelligence Community may still have to devote more 
resources towards decryption if the company’s internal traffic is encrypted in 
this scenario. 
End-to-end encryption poses another problem.  The Intelligence Community 
will have to devote resources to conducting man-in-the-middle attacks and 
compromising end-users to obtain desired communications when it encounters 
end-to-end encryption.  If the government is interested in a particular 
conversation between two individuals, the government can relay the messages 
between the users to trick the users into thinking that they are connecting directly 
with each other when in reality the government has inserted itself into the 
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communications as an attacker.303  For example, if the government is interested 
in a particular conversation between two individuals, Alice and Bob, the 
government can attempt to replace the Bob’s public encryption key with its own 
Intelligence Community public key to conduct an active man-in-the-middle 
attack because Alice will now be sending her messages to the Intelligence 
Community and not Bob.304   The Intelligence Community can then forward 
Alice’s messages to Bob so as not to tip off Bob to the fact that the Intelligence 
Community has inserted itself into Alice and Bob’s communications.305  The 
Intelligence Community could even change messages that Alice sends to Bob so 
that Bob sees the manipulated messages if this would be useful for an intelligence 
operation. 306   Often times, the Intelligence Community will first need to 
compromise the private key of a trusted intermediary company that serves as a 
broker of public keys in order for the Intelligence Community to be able to send 
Alice the Intelligence Community’s public key as a replacement for Bob’s public 
key and successfully trick Alice into thinking she has actually been given Bob’s 
public key. 307   Conducting narrowly targeted man-in-the-middle attacks and 
compromising specific end-users may be quite resource intensive because these 
types of attacks do not generally provide for broad collection opportunities.308  
Therefore, these attacks against end-to-end encryption may only be feasible 
against higher value targets.309  Finally, the Intelligence Community will need to 
continue to exploit metadata with technical analysis because metadata is often 
unencrypted.  While metadata can be “a valuable source of information” and 
help map networks, “it does not replace the definitive value of content.”310 
B. Improved Cooperation from Companies 
Despite the rather adversarial relationship between some companies and the 
United States government that has developed in the aftermath of the Snowden 
disclosures, this environment may not persist forever.  The United States 
government should continue to work to develop strong relationships with United 
States technology companies and seek to mend to fissures that have been 
created.  Technology companies have been great innovators for our society and 
are extremely important to the United States economy.  In 2014, Internet-related 
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companies in the United States generated $966.2 billion in revenue, which 
accounted for six percent of real Gross Domestic Product. 311   “Economic 
strength enables countries to have political and military power and to have strong 
geopolitical influence.” 312   Therefore, the government should continue to 
champion the innovations that occur at these companies.  Further, these private-
sector technology companies will develop many of the technological tools that 
the Intelligence Community will use in the future as an increasing amount of 
technology is being produced in the private sector rather than inside the 
government. 313   For example, Amazon has contracted with the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) to provide cloud computing for the Intelligence 
Community, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) has 
contracted with private firms “to enhance artificial intelligence and automation 
to improve geospatial-intelligence analysis.” 314   Working to maintain and 
improve relationships across the board with technology companies can pay 
dividends in obtaining better cooperation in the future.  Cooperation from 
technology companies will always be very helpful to SIGINT collection because 
private companies own the communications systems.315 
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C. Cooperation with Foreign Entities and Compromising Key Strategic 
Targets 
As SIGINT collection under Executive Order 12333 becomes more important, 
the Intelligence Community must increase its focus on obtaining the cooperation 
of foreign entities and compromising key strategic targets.  Partner arrangements 
between governments and intelligence services to facilitate intelligence sharing 
and access to key collection platforms and facilities is an incredibly important 
aspect of intelligence collection.316  As Section 702 becomes less useful in the 
future, the United States will need to rely more on foreign governments to share 
intelligence and encourage technology companies within those foreign nations 
to cooperate with the United States.  These intelligence-sharing relationships 
will help the United States Intelligence Community gain access to pristine and 
complete communications in a safer environment, which are important factors 
that have made Section 702 such a vital intelligence gathering authority.317  
Relationships and deals between intelligence services and allied governments 
can always entail certain limitations, though, such as the need to provide more 
robust privacy protections to citizens of another country in the SIGINT that is 
obtained as a result of an arrangement than would otherwise be provided or use 
restrictions on the intelligence that is shared.318  Nonetheless, the tradeoffs 
typically favor engaging in these intelligence relationships unless the same 
information can be collected in another manner because the United States will 
almost certainly always be better off with more intelligence.319 
The United States must increase the amount of resources that it devotes to 
effectively compromising key strategic targets.  Some of this will be 
accomplished by human intelligence (HUMINT) operations—this can be 
thought of as HUMINT enabled SIGINT.  Intelligence officers may be able to 
recruit assets inside foreign technology companies that can provide access to 
those communications systems or develop fruitful relationships with the leaders 
of key strategic foreign technology companies.320 
The Intelligence Community will also need to increase its exploitation of 
vulnerabilities (i.e., conduct more remote hacking operations) for SIGINT 
collection as the amount of fruitful intelligence obtained under Section 702 
diminishes.  It takes significant time and resources to find vulnerabilities and 
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money to purchase vulnerabilities, as well as significant effort to develop the 
tools to exploit these vulnerabilities. 321   These vulnerabilities are transient, 
though, as eventually they are discovered and patched or new products and 
services are developed that do not have the same vulnerabilities.322  This means 
that the Intelligence Community will constantly need to innovate to exploit 
vulnerabilities to be able to collect SIGINT at scale.  Many of these capabilities 
will depend on investing in research and development, talented personnel, and 
the necessary infrastructure to conduct these intelligence operations.323 
Increased aggressiveness in exploiting vulnerabilities to conduct SIGINT 
operations could result in diplomatic blowback when operations are discovered.  
The foreign policy challenges and strained alliance relationships that can result 
from disclosed intelligence operations are important factors to consider at the 
outset of deciding whether to conduct intelligence operations.324  The risk of 
blowback can therefore be a key limitation on intelligence operations.  While 
there was a great deal of diplomatic backlash following the Snowden 
disclosures, there is a general understanding among nations that countries spy 
on one another.325  The key question of whether to proceed with an operation or 
whether the risks are too great to proceed will always be a context dependent 
inquiry.  Intelligence officials will have to weigh the value of the target, the 
country or countries that will be affected by the operation and their relationship 
with the United States, the threat environment and diplomatic challenges that are 
present at a given point in time, and other factors when deciding whether to 
conduct operations while being mindful that operations seldom stay secret 
forever. 
This increased reliance on exploiting vulnerabilities will lead to increased 
debate over when the government should disclose vulnerabilities to vendors or 
hold onto these vulnerabilities.  The Vulnerabilities Equities Process (VEP), 
which is the process that the United States government has created to decide 
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when the government should disclose previously unknown (zero-day) 
vulnerabilities, has already sparked rigorous debate on this topic.326  While the 
government has important intelligence, military, and law enforcement interests 
in discovering and keeping vulnerabilities to exploit, there are also valid 
cybersecurity reasons for disclosing some vulnerabilities and United States 
technology companies that may benefit from vulnerability disclosure are an 
important part of the United States economy.  In addition to the important 
intelligence that will increasingly be gathered through the exploitation of 
vulnerabilities—and likely will not be able to be collected through other 
means—which weigh in favor of holding onto vulnerabilities, disclosing 
vulnerabilities may risk potentially informing adversaries about the United 
States Intelligence Community’s sources and methods.327  Further, the United 
States’ adversaries do not engage in similar vulnerability disclosure programs, 
which could potentially put the United States in an intelligence gathering and 
military disadvantage in the future relative to adversary countries that are able 
to continuously stockpile vulnerabilities without disclosing them.328 
On the other hand, there are salient arguments in favor of disclosure.  
Disclosing vulnerabilities enables companies to patch the vulnerabilities, thus 
fixing their products.329  This improves cybersecurity overall and helps these 
companies to have more secure products.330  For the last several years, the 
United States Intelligence Community has listed the cyber threat as the top threat 
in its worldwide threat assessment report and United States companies lose 
hundreds of billions of dollars in intellectual property theft per year.331  Further, 
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adversary nations may discover the same vulnerability as the United States has 
discovered and may seek to use the vulnerability to target United States interests, 
which would weigh heavily in favor of disclosure in such situations. 
There will certainly be situations in which it is an easy call not to disclose.  
For example, the United States should obviously not disclose a vulnerability 
when the United States discovers a vulnerability in a foreign adversary 
government’s system that the foreign country contracted for with a foreign 
company in that country.  A vulnerability that has little intelligence value yet 
exists on systems that many Americans use would be an obvious example of a 
situation in which the government should disclose.  The more difficult decisions 
are those that implicate important offensive and defensive interests.  United 
States officials will have to consider the likelihood that another group will also 
discover the vulnerability, the risk of a leak of the vulnerability, how quickly a 
vendor could develop a patch for the vulnerability and how widespread the 
adoption of the patch would be, the importance of the target the vulnerability is 
being used on, and the susceptibility of United States interests to the same 
vulnerability among other important considerations when deciding whether to 
hold onto or disclose a vulnerability. 
D. Technical Investments to Improve Analysis Capabilities 
Beyond enhancing SIGINT collection capabilities, the Intelligence 
Community must focus on improving the ability to conduct intelligence analysis 
at scale.  As numerous observers have noted, “the increase in the total amount 
of data also creates problems in the form of ever-larger haystacks in which the 
government must find the needles.”332  Perhaps a more apt analogy is that it is 
                                                     
(2017), 
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/SSCI%20Unclassified%20SFR%2
0-%20Final.pdf; JAMES R. CLAPPER, OFFICE OF THE DIR. NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, STATEMENT FOR 
THE RECORD, WORLDWIDE THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 1–4 
(2016), 
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/SASC_Unclassified_2016_ATA_SFR_FINAL.pdf; JAMES 
R. CLAPPER, OFFICE OF THE DIR. NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD, 
WORLDWIDE THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 1–4 (2015), 
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Unclassified_2015_ATA_SFR_-_SASC_FINAL.pdf; JAMES 
R. CLAPPER, OFFICE OF THE DIR. NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD, 
WORLDWIDE THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 1–3 (2014), 
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Intelligence%20Reports/2014%20WWTA%20%20SFR_SS
CI_29_Jan.pdf; JAMES R. CLAPPER, OFFICE OF THE DIR. NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, STATEMENT FOR 




 332. Kris, supra note 65, at 417. 
Fall 2019]Adapting U.S. Electronic Surveillance Laws, Policies, and Practices 119 
“like looking for a needle in a stack of needles” 333  as important pieces of 
intelligence do not necessarily stand out in the sea of information—analysts 
must sift through the massive quantities of information to determine what is 
important.334  The great value in SIGINT collection can only be realized if 
analysts are able to find the useful pieces of information. 
Unlike downstream collection under Section 702 in which the 
communications “to” and “from” a selector are provided to the NSA in a manner 
that is highly likely to yield intact copies of the entirety of the communications, 
Executive Order 12333 collection cannot necessarily provide such tailored 
acquisition.  The Intelligence Community must invest in developing and 
purchasing the technological tools, such as artificial intelligence, that can assist 
in conducting intelligence analysis at scale to be able to sift through massive 
quantities of data.335  These tools will play an increasingly critical role in sorting 
through data to find useful intelligence, and can be leveraged to improve the 
usefulness of SIGINT collection under Executive Order 12333.336  Further, the 
Intelligence Community should continue to invest in machine translation tools.  
Linguistic analysis has been a limiting factor for all intelligence agencies, and 
this problem will only get worse as more data is generated.337  There will not be 
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enough human-hours to be able to translate communications by human linguists.  
Instead, machine translation, though imperfect, can dramatically increase the 
Intelligence Community’s efficiency in this area.  Finally, the Intelligence 
Community must invest in technologies that can work to piece packets of 
communications together to form complete communications automatically by 
drawing on data packets across multiple streams of SIGINT acquisition.  A 
tremendous advantage of Section 702 has been the ability to obtain precise and 
complete communications, but as Section 702 becomes less useful, Executive 
Order 12333 will need to make up for this lost intelligence. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Section 702 was a critical intelligence collection reform that addressed 
technological developments to enable the Intelligence Community to acquire 
vital foreign intelligence to protect United States national security interests and 
inform policymakers.338  Section 702 enables the Intelligence Community to 
collect intelligence on non-United States persons that are reasonably believed to 
be overseas when the Intelligence Community reasonably believes it will likely 
acquire foreign intelligence from surveilling these individuals without having to 
undergo the significant step of establishing probable cause that the target is an 
agent of a foreign power, probable cause that each facility is being used or is 
about to be used by a foreign power or agent of a foreign power, and that the 
information could not be reasonably obtained by normal investigative 
methods.339  The Intelligence Community would simply not be able to maintain 
nearly the same level of intelligence collection without Section 702 if it were 
forced to rely on FISA Title I.  Also, Section 702 allows for collection to occur 
in a stable and safe domestic environment.  Under downstream, the 
communications “to” and “from” a selector are even provided to the NSA in a 
manner that is highly likely to yield intact copies of the entirety of the 
communications.340 
While the collection programs under Section 702 have produced a great deal 
of valuable intelligence over the last decade, the United States must begin to 
think about impending technological developments and strategically consider 
how to conduct SIGINT collection in the future.  The United States’ current legal 
regime governing SIGINT activities is predicated on the location of the target.  
If location becomes significantly difficult to determine because of the increased 
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prevalence and advancement of location-spoofing and anonymity technologies, 
the United States may have to reconsider how location should factor into this 
legal paradigm.  Anonymity tools mask information about a user’s true identity 
and location that can be critical for the NSA’s ability to lawfully target 
individuals under Section 702.  Although anonymity tools may not become 
widespread, these technologies can still currently pose problems for the NSA 
and the increased prevalence of illicit actors using anonymity technologies will 
make the NSA’s work more difficult, especially in regard to illicit actors that 
use sophisticated tradecraft.  Location-spoofing technologies are very likely to 
be widely adopted and may cause substantial problems for the NSA.  Location-
spoofing technologies make it appear as if communications are actually coming 
from an intermediary computer instead of the original user, which can hide the 
user’s true location.  These technologies may hinder the NSA’s ability to target 
individuals under Section 702 and could create a major resource problem for the 
NSA in its post-tasking analysis or cause the NSA to have to detask targets and 
lose the ability to gather intelligence on these targets. 
In a world in which location becomes extremely difficult to accurately 
determine, the United States should reform FISA to create a new category for 
non-United States persons appearing to be located in the United States.  These 
individuals, who the Intelligence Community could not develop a reasonable 
belief that they were outside the United States, but still reasonably believed were 
non-United States persons, could still be targeted if the Intelligence Community 
has reasonable suspicion that these individuals are likely to possess, receive, 
and/or communicate foreign intelligence information rather than forcing the 
NSA or FBI to establish probable cause that these individuals are agents of a 
foreign power as long as the Intelligence Community has not conclusively 
determined that these individuals are physically located inside the United States.  
The FISC would be required to make this reasonable suspicion determination on 
an individualized basis because of the privacy concerns that are implicated by 
the fact that some of these targets that are non-United States persons appearing 
to be located inside the United States will indeed actually be located inside the 
United States and not just using technologies that make this appear to be the 
case.  If the Intelligence Community gained conclusive evidence that the target 
is actually physically located inside the United States, then the Intelligence 
Community would have one week to shift collection to FISA Title I.  This reform 
could take advantage of minimization at the point of collection to enhance 
privacy protections for the United States persons that communicate with the non-
United States person appearing to be located inside the United States target, and 
data acquired under this new category could be tagged and treated as a special 
category of information that has a relatively short retention period. 
If this reform would still not be sufficient to address the significant problems 
created by technological developments and the adoption of these technologies 
such that SIGINT collection under Section 702 was severely hindered, it could 
be necessary to reform FISA by creating two categories: one for United States 
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persons and one for non-United States persons.  Both of these reforms would 
rely heavily on the foreign intelligence exception to the warrant clause in the 
Fourth Amendment. 
It may be prudent to create more forward leaning procedures to ease some of 
the difficulties that could be caused by increased uncertainty of the location of 
targets.  One approach would be to build lists of IP addresses that are associated 
with known VPN providers.  If procedures allow for greater collection of 
communications on the front-end, the Intelligence Community can develop 
greater back-end privacy protections to ensure that collection efforts remain 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  Finally, the Intelligence Community 
should be proactive in explaining the technological challenges that it faces to the 
FISC.  Ideally, a more proactive approach can create a more collaborative 
environment where the NSA, DOJ, and FISC can find the proper balance of rules 
and procedures that allow for the needed flexibility to adjust to new technical 
challenges while providing adequate privacy protections for those who are 
protected by the Fourth Amendment. 
Further, Section 702 will likely become less useful in the future.  The United 
States’ home field advantage is receding, which means that the United States 
will have a smaller share of the world’s communications traffic transit its 
physical infrastructure.341  This will reduce the Intelligence Community’s ability 
to acquire precise and intact communications by serving directives on United 
States companies.  The push towards data localization could diminish the 
market share of United States companies and could exacerbate the trend 
towards a smaller percentage of the world’s communications transiting the 
United States.  In addition, technology companies have begun to innovate in a 
manner that reduces their capability to respond to lawful orders.  Technology 
companies have increasingly adopted encryption technologies and may shift 
data overseas to try to avoid complying with lawful surveillance orders.  As 
Section 702 becomes less useful in the future, the Intelligence Community must 
assess how it can improve collection under Executive Order 12333 to ensure 
that the government continues to acquire vital intelligence to protect United 
States national security interests. 
One approach to alleviating the difficulties that encryption poses for Section 
702 would be for Congress to enact a lawful access requirement.342  Encryption 
would still pose a problem for SIGINT collection that occurs under Executive 
Order 12333, which will become more important as the United States’ home 
field advantage diminishes, regardless of whether Congress enacts a lawful 
access requirement because technology companies outside of the United States 
are also adopting these technologies.  The NSA must therefore continue to invest 
resources in being able to decrypt communications and acquiring unencrypted 
communications.  The United States government should continue to work to 
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develop strong relationships with United States technology companies and seek 
to mend to fissures that have been created in the aftermath of the Snowden 
disclosures. 
Also, as SIGINT collection under Executive Order 12333 becomes more 
important, the Intelligence Community must increase its focus on obtaining the 
cooperation of foreign entities and compromising key strategic targets.  The 
United States will need to rely more on foreign governments to share intelligence 
and encourage technology companies within those foreign nations to cooperate 
with the United States.  The United States must increase the amount of resources 
that it devotes to compromising key strategic targets effectively.  Some of this 
will be accomplished by HUMINT enabled SIGINT.  The Intelligence 
Community will also need to increase its exploitation of vulnerabilities for 
SIGINT collection. 
Finally, beyond enhancing SIGINT collection capabilities, the Intelligence 
Community must focus on improving the ability to conduct intelligence analysis 
at scale.  The Intelligence Community must invest in developing and acquiring 
technological tools that can assist in conducting intelligence analysis at scale to 
be able to sift through massive quantities of data. 
These reforms and strategic investments can help ensure that United States 
SIGINT activities evolve to meet future technological developments and 
continue to provide the necessary intelligence to protect United States national 
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